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The ED's 1992 visit to Iraq: Rob Carr

Rob in Dohuk, Iraq in 1992
It was late 1992 a few months after I first joined UNICEF in Northern Iraq.  We learned the Executive Director, Mr. Grant, was coming for a visit.  My province was chosen for logistical reasons, and I was tasked with planning every hour of his one-day visit.

We had no phones, no internet—just 12 people sharing one laptop and a HF radio. That laptop was connected to the radio, which could send short messages (called SITOR—simplex teletype over radio)  to another laptop hooked to another radio. I spent endless hours driving different routes and typing out proposed plans via SITOR. Feedback came only after my texts to our comms officer were reviewed and were faxed to New York and a reply came back. It was painstaking.  

SITOR setup
 I don’t recall how many times we manually retyped the itinerary and sent it off into the radio airwaves where it would arrive and be printed on a dot matrix printer.  The printer would WHIR as the message arrived. We would chat over the crackling HF radio with the comms officer and she would tell us what to change – 30 more minutes there, make sure to meet children, have a back up plan for each stop - and leave plenty of time to get back to Baghdad. 

Finally, Mr. Grant arrived—flanked by our Representative and the Regional Director and Ops officer. I took the group to a remote community via a treacherous mountain road. I asked Mr Grant to ride in our office car—a battered HiLux pickup with bald tires—so we could talk on the way.  A visit from Mr. Grant felt like having your most amazing uncle come to see you. He asked questions, listened intently, his sharp blue eyes following every word.  I have never felt so important as the time when he sat next to me and really cared about what I said.  

We skidded on icy patches; he grabbed my shoulder as the car swerved, his grip fierce. When we reached the tiny village, he rubbed his palms together, he was READY TO SEE SOME KIDS. But there were no kids. His face fell. The other UNICEF leaders scowled at me—WHY NO KIDS? Mr. Grant LOVES kids.

He asked the village leader: “Where are the children?” 

The elderly man explained passionately: after the Gulf War, this entire village had fled Saddam Hussein’s forces. Their homes had been razed repeatedly to force Kurds into cities where their movements could be controlled. Families had just returned again, but with no water and no school, children stayed in a nearby city while parents rebuilt from the rubble. Kurds were used to starting over and were undaunted.  That village had been re-built 4 times according to the elders.

Mr. Grant’s heart sank. He promised the elders UNICEF would help bring their children home. (my heart sank too – how would we do this?)

On the drive back, he asked what I needed to make that happen. I rattled off a verbal plan—WASH, schools, supplies. He took notes in a tiny notebook kept in his breast pocket, his arm was around me as we stepped out of the pickup. He squeezed my shoulder firmly as we made our way to join the others and whispered “We will get what you need – you just be ready!” 

At our office he sat with my team and listened intently – they each shared what was needed. Even our driver apologized for the icy skid—explaining we had bald tires and no SUVs like the Rep’s car. We’d asked for snow tires many times, with no response. I handed Mr. Grant and the others copies of unanswered faxes requesting basic supplies.

The Rep and RD tried to rush him—there was a reception with Ambassadors in Baghdad. But Mr. Grant smelled food in the kitchen: spiced rice pilau, lamb, stuffed grape leaves. When I told him my team had cooked lunch for him, he told the Rep to radio Baghdad: start the reception later. He sat down and ate with us. He listened to every challenge we had, darting stern looks at the Rep, the RD and operations officer as we spoke.  When he was full of rice, dessert, and tea, he stood for a group photo and left.

We worried we’d be fired for showing him no kids and complaining about lack of support. All we could talk about was that visit – we rehashed every step and every promise that was made.  Surely we were doomed.   

But three days later, a convoy of trucks arrived—with new tires, a 4WD vehicle, more radios, and WASH supplies. In addition to these much needed supplies and equipment we learned Mr. Grant had gone back to New York and raised almost $30 million in pledgers for winterization to help Kurdish children return home. Our work for the next months was to implement that response. We asked for help—and he delivered.

Funds poured in. Our first major convoy of winter supplies came into Iraq via Turkey—a huge operation to support families in makeshift shelters before the bitter winter hit. The Norwegian (NRC secondee) escort radioed us -  thrilled they’d made it to Erbil in one piece. Then, over the radio, we heard deep explosions in the background. One by one, each truck blew up—bombs had planted under the trucks along the route, timed to detonate on arrival. Somehow no one was hurt, but hundreds of tons of supplies were lost. Contracting transport after that was nearly impossible. Our euphoria had turned to fear: what would blow up next? Who wanted to stop us from helping these people? How did they know so much about us?  We would face more bombs in the coming months – but we were not deterred.  No one from UNDSS was hovering over us – we had to use our instincts to navigate safely. 

It was a wonderful and chaotic time to join UNICEF.  

They don’t make them like Mr Grant anymore – yes he was flawed at times and he always asked a lot of us – but he never waivered in his support.   His promises to those elders and to my staff were genuine. He valued his time with me and my team over the Ambassadors waiting in Baghdad.  We were not fired for asking for basic support to do our work.

Rob and Sundus: this year and 1992 in Iraq

Comments

  1. For half a century, Western policy toward Iraq has been less a principled stance than a choreography of contradiction, an oscillation from indulgence to hostility, from enabling to annihilating. The great irony of the 21st century is that the menace the West eventually vowed to eradicate was, for a crucial decade, its own strategic creation.

    Before Iraq became a byword for brutality, it was, awkwardly for later liberation narratives, a rare Middle Eastern development success. In the 1970s, the Ba’athist state channelled oil revenues into a sweeping modernisation drive. Literacy soared, women entered universities and industry at rates that would embarrass several contemporary US allies, and GDP per capita multiplied sevenfold. Western capitals quietly admired the secular strongman who promised order in a turbulent region.

    Then the Iranian Revolution upended the script. With the Shah gone and a theocracy rising next door, Saddam Hussein became an indispensable buffer. What followed during the Iran–Iraq War was not passive tolerance but active, calculated support. Washington supplied battlefield intelligence with astonishing specificity. European firms exported “dual-use” technology that was, in practice, essential to Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons programmes. The same governments that would later condemn Saddam’s arsenal had, only years earlier, approved the shipments that built it.

    When the war ended and Iraq was left exhausted, indebted, and far less useful, the West executed a dramatic reversal. Saddam’s catastrophic invasion of Kuwait in 1990 provided the moral pretext. Yesterday’s quiet partner became today’s unambiguous villain. The 1991 military campaign had legitimacy; what followed did not. The UN sanctions regime, driven by Washington and London, became one of the most comprehensive acts of economic strangulation ever imposed. Iraq could not import chlorine for water treatment, basic medical equipment, or even certain school materials. Everything became “dual-use”; nothing was innocent. The humanitarian toll was predictable, vast, and largely ignored.

    And then came 2003. Western leaders spoke as though Saddam had appeared fully formed as an existential threat, his weapons programmes a mysterious danger conjured out of the desert. Absent from the narrative was the obvious truth: the Iraq they sought to destroy was the Iraq they had earlier built up, armed, encouraged, and then economically shattered.

    The Iraq War did not erupt from a sudden moral awakening. It grew from decades of selective morality, where strategic utility dictated virtue and vice. Iraq was backed when convenient, starved when expendable, and invaded when politically convenient.

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    1. Very well stated! It can come only from one who had experienced the ground realities of those troubled times. I wish the commentator had chosen to write by his name rather than remain anonymous.

      I joined UNICEF Baghdad just a year before Rob did in the North, I in June 1991 at the UNICEF country office in Baghdad,, close on the heels of the ceasefire and with a semblance of negative peace on the ground. Programme support to the North with regular field visits was an essential part of my responsibility. To that extent I remain familiar with the constraints that Rob speaks of. Nevertheless, it was a challenge well enough and that's what made it so 'wonderful', borrowing again Rob's word to describe the experience.

      Gianni Ezio Murzi was our Rep and with Ed Lannert as the RD in Amman and Nigel Fischer as his Deputy, we were in safe hands in those troubled times. I recall an incident (which Gianni I am sure will recall) when a UNV in our team (a trained and seasoned nurse } returned from her daily visit to a local hospital in the evening, in distress and in tears, to report that she witnessed a young woman's tragic death in the emergency ward since the doctors could not carry out a Caesarean section owing to lack of anaesthetics. The report itself was overwhelming. I walked up to Gianni to seek help. He replied: "Go ahead, pick up the phone, and call both Amman and Ankara, whichever can be the source to rush an emergency supply."

      I did. It worked. Amman hesitated. Ankara rushed in a truckload of Nitrous Oxide cylinders by road. This token gesture of ours set the trend for many INGOs to follow.

      There are many more anecdotes relating to my Iraq days, not all negative. I had a great friend and colleague in Sidiq Ibrahim at the Baghdad office, a tall, handsome Sudanese who grew up in the UK. Both Gianni Murzi and Rafah Aziz (another great friend) will certainly recall our association with Sidiq. One day, Sidiq and I were at a local coffee shop, outdoor, witnessing a bunch of street children in their wild revelry nearby. They were all under ten by age and war victims, witness to violence and conflict through their childhood. Sidiq (who spoke fluent Arabic) could call over one of the little ones and tried showering some acts of kindness. The little child resisted and recoiled, which surprised me. On reflection I could understand he has lost trust in humanity. That does not heal with band-aid!

      Going back to our 'anonymous' commentator, we do often intellectualise on global issues, but miss out much on the human dimension behind them. I love being the foot-soldier, muddying my boots on the ground to fight the good fight with all our might.

      There's much to do in our little ways! I am a small man. For me as a development worker, somewhat old fashioned maybe, but still inspired by the German-born, British economist, E.F. Schumacher, the small has always remained beautiful.



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  2. Children, women, and men - all dispensable pawn in the hands of maneuvering kings and queens. Can UN or anyone else intervene?

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  3. Great account, Rob, thankyou for sharing. Rozanne

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  4. As a Kurd who joined UNICEF five years later, in early 1997, I could not describe those years any better. I started my work at the beginning of the Oil-for-Food Programme (UN Security Council Resolution 986). At that time, the Kurdish-controlled areas were under double sanctions—both the 661 Committee and the Iraqi government. Nothing was allowed to enter: no medicine, no supplies, nothing.

    With no electricity and no functioning water networks, people were eventually forced to sell whatever they owned. Even doors were burned for cooking and heating. And as if the double sanctions were not enough, drought deepened the suffering.

    People—no matter how old, weak, or sick—had to be loaded onto lorries to cross the buffer line between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi army. They were required to undergo blood tests before being allowed into Iraq. They had to endure unprecedented humiliation simply because they needed to cross the line, often just to seek medical treatment.

    Today, Kurdistan is more developed and vastly different from those days—but the same game is still being played.

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  5. The anonymous commentary to Rob Carr’s article is passionate but may be missing some relevant aspects of the situation in the Middle East. Like, “Why would Saddam care so much for his people that he found it necessary to wage an 8 year war against his Iranian neighbour with huge death tolls on both sides – when one remembers that the majority of (southern) Iraqis were Shia Muslims like the vast majority of Iranians ?” and “Why would Saddam find it essential to try to destroy Iraqi Kurds in the way in which he did ? (Check out the history surrounding the failed 1991 Kurdish revolt, the Anfal and the nerve agent attack on Halabja on 16th March, 1988.)

    To me, Halabja was significant. As I was leading the WatSan response in the Food for Oil programme in 1997/98 in northern Iraq, I was concerned that all areas of Kurdish Iraq should benefit equally. Halabja was as far west as we could go (without entering Iran) and our staff had not visited it to see what the situation was 9 to 10 years after the attack. My Kurdish national colleagues were really apprehensive that we should not delay too long in the area but what we saw was sobering. I was told that the whole area around Halabja was, at that time, controlled by fundamentalists who saw any visitors as ‘the enemy’ so it was not possible to have a discussion with them; but what we saw in the town remains vivid in my memory. No birds were seen anywhere in Halabja. No grass nor trees was growing anywhere in the town. Not a single flower was seen anywhere. The town itself was a mix of abandoned houses and rubble much as it had been immediately after the attack. How many other villages remained like this after those attacks controlled by Chemical Ali ? And how to attempt to provide all and any necessary infrastructure that Saddam had effectively destroyed not only to the Halabjas but to every other settlement in the Kurdish north ?

    Speaking personally, I saw many UNICEF staff who did outstanding work during my time in Erbil. Was it that they just had to use common sense rather than consulting all those UNICEF documents beloved by the Admin staff globally ? Quite probably. We were assisted (in the WatSan response) by many NGOs who had to be trained in the technical requirements and who worked as UNICEF partners. Best of all, the local government rural development organisation had a number of women working in their technical department who showed how women should be included as equal partners in the sort of work that was involved.

    I had the good fortune to have a (Kurdish) secretary who was possessed of more academic qualifications than I was – and who had a wonderful sense of humour. He frequently translated for me especially when I was conducting training sessions for the NGOs in the software that was needed for water supply designs. To this day, we still correspond, comparing notes on how our respective retirements are working out. It was a privilege to have worked with him and many of the other Kurdish staff. His name was Saman. . . . .

    Thank you Rob for reminding me of a time when I was allowed to work in Iraq.

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    1. The 1991 uprising emerged directly from the aftermath of the Gulf War, when President George H.W. Bush publicly encouraged Iraqis to take action against Saddam Hussein. This call to action proved crucial in prompting the widespread rebellion that followed. The Kurdish rebellion proved particularly successful in the northern regions, where insurgents quickly captured several cities. However, the initial success was short-lived. Iraqi troops soon recaptured the Kurdish areas, ruthlessly subduing the rebellion.

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    2. Thanks Ken - i travelled all over when I was first with IRC and then UNICEF - and was taken through the hellscape that was Halabja. Every night around dinner time - local TV would replay the footage of the families lying dead wherever they were standing the day Halabja was bombed with chemicals. It was hard to watch - and the message was NEVER FORGET. And in my story there is ALOT of context and history missing. That village we visited had been razed FOUR TIMES - why? One could do many PhDs on this time in history and the unique place in history where Kurds straddle and stuggle with so many things at once.

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  6. Thanks for the comments. It was a euphoric time to be Kurdistan, Iraq--working side by side with brave Iraqi kurds who gave it all as they took their first steps without a harsh government on their necks. Iraq had a rough time for next 2 decades - but the self governing Kurdish governorates did well relative to the rest of the country - the rest being ravaged by sanctions and the horrible occupation from 2003 and the to and fro and the rise of extremism. The northern areas graciously hosted refugees who fled Syria--lending a hand. Kurdish fighters helped lead a manhunt to find and eliminate ISIS. And as usual, the bravery of these people was not recognised by the west. It was a once in a lifetime chance to be on the ground floor of big change - I will never forget it.

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  7. That's a beautiful account of shared memories, especially of Mr. James Grant . We were blessed to have him as our leader. There was never another one like him. Warm wishes to you and Sundus from Islamabad.

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