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When One Third of a City's Sewage Hinged on 100 Crumbling Columns: Another Story of Ingenuity Under Sanctions - By Zaid Jurji


Welding of Supporting Cylinder Steel Columns
In 1999, while serving as Head of the Water and Sanitation Programme at UNICEF Iraq, we were approached by the Baghdad Sewage Authority with an urgent plea. The Al-Karkh conveyance channel; a critical piece of infrastructure serving the western half of Baghdad, was on the verge of collapse.

This was the sanctions era. The Oil-for-Food Programme was in place, but it came with a fundamental constraint: Iraqi authorities had no control over cash. The OFFP could supply equipment and materials, but funding local works required navigating a labyrinth of restrictions. Once again, conventional solutions were off the table. We had to think differently.

This is the story of how a small team of UNICEF national engineers saved a piece of infrastructure that Baghdad depended on and with ingenuity, precision, and a fraction of what a conventional rebuild would have cost. But more than an engineering triumph, it was a lesson in what service truly means. There is no greater reward than serving your community. To serve your people, your friends, and their families is a unique privilege. It asks you to give everything; to attempt the impossible and make it possible. The feeling of giving back is beyond description.

The Context: A City Built on Flat Land

Baghdad sits on remarkably flat topography. This simple geographical fact shapes everything about how the city manages its sewage. Wastewater cannot flow by gravity alone over long distances. Instead, the system relies on a cascade of pumping stations that lift sewage back up, again and again, to keep it moving toward treatment.

Al-Karkh Treatment Plant serves the western part of the city, designed to handle approximately 270,000 cubic meters of sewage per day and serving around 1.8 million people.

The system works like this: a network of pipes collects sewage from homes and neighborhoods, flowing by gravity through carefully sloped pipes. When the pipes reach a certain depth, a pumping station lifts the sewage back up. This repeats across the city. At the final stage, the sewage is pumped into an open conveyance channel, which carries it to the treatment plant.  That channel was the problem.

The Problem: A Channel Falling Apart

The Al-Karkh conveyance channel was 1.5 km long, composed of open concrete segments 3 meters high, 6 meters wide and 8 meters long, all lined with a bituminous layer for concrete protection. These segments sat on concrete beams on both ends, which were supported by over 100 concrete columns, each 40 cm × 40 cm. Depending on topography, some of these segments were sitting directly on ground level.

The channel was poorly constructed. Its joints leaked. Along its journey, the sewage becomes septic and organic matter results in acids which are corrosive and attack the concrete.

The results were predictable and devastating:  The concrete on the columns began to peel, exposing the reinforcing steel, which in turn got corroded, thus drastically reducing each column's bearing capacity.

Worse still, the soil beneath the channel was characterized by very high levels of gypsum. When the leaking sewage mixed with the gypsum, it dissolved the underground deposits, creating voids and causing the soil to collapse.

The footings settled. The columns sank. The entire structure was failing.

The potential consequence was catastrophic: the total collapse of the channel would mean that the untreated sewage of nearly a third of Baghdad inhabitants, would discharge freely into the environment. The pollution and public health disaster that would follow was almost unthinkable.

The Solution: Engineering Creativity Under Pressure

The UNICEF WASH team was tasked with finding a solution. The works were led by my colleague Emil Sequeira, a brilliant structural engineer. We were both graduates of the same engineering school. He earned his BSc and MSc in structural engineering, while I earned mine in water resources engineering. He was the top of our class for four years running. Works focused on two fronts:

1. Stop the leakage.
The leaking joints were the root cause. Without stopping the leaks, any repair would be temporary. We needed to stabilize the structure and prevent further deterioration.

2. Repair and reinforce the structure.
Some columns were minimally affected. Others were severely damaged. The repair strategy had to address both.

For the damaged columns, we:
- Cleaned the exposed reinforcement and removed all peeling concrete.
- Repaired the structural damage as thoroughly as possible.

But we knew that repair alone would not restore full bearing capacity. To prevent any future collapse, we introduced new steel columns alongside the damaged concrete ones.

These steel columns were ingenious in their simplicity: each was composed of two cylindrical sections, one slightly larger than the other, allowing them to be adjusted and installed beneath the existing concrete segments. Once in place, hydraulic jacks were used to apply load, and the two sections were welded together—transferring the weight of the channel onto the new steel supports.  Beneath each steel column, a new concrete foundation was constructed.

3. Restore the soil.
The gypsum soil had been weakened by years of leakage, creating voids and gaps. To address this, we injected cement mortar through hundreds of injection points, filling the underground gaps and stabilizing the soil strata.

4. The impossible section.
In one area, the damage was so severe that the soil was thought to be beyond repair. Here, we took a different approach: two steel trusses were constructed, with their bases extending beyond the width of the channel. One end of each truss was fixed; the other was jacked up using hydraulic jacks. Once the required level was reached, steel sheets were inserted to fill the gap, creating a stable support system.

The Outcome: Maximum Impact, Minimal Cost

The results were remarkable. The channel restored its structural capacity. It continued to convey sewage safely to the treatment plant. A catastrophe was averted.

And it was achieved with a relatively small financial amount. Thanks entirely to the ingenuity of the UNICEF WASH team. There was no massive reconstruction contract, just a simple one. No imported heavy machinery. Just smart engineering, careful planning, and the courage to try solutions that had never been attempted before.

Final Reflection

This project, like the Al-Rasheed Water Treatment Plant rehabilitation, stands as a testament to what is possible when constraints force creativity. Under sanctions, with limited resources and no access to conventional solutions, we found a way.

UNICEF stood tall as the main supporter of Iraq's water and sanitation sector during the sanctions era—not because we had unlimited resources, but because we had committed, creative engineers who refused to accept that a city of millions should be left without essential services.

This is the kind of work that makes me proud. Not just the engineering, but the mindset: when the obvious path is blocked, build a new one.


Reinforcement of additional concrete foundation

Preparing the jacking process of the trusses

Completed repair works under one segment

Comments

  1. I was WASH officer in UNICEF Dohuk in 1992- 93 - we had to be very creative. Love this article!

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    Replies
    1. Thanks Rob. Have we ever met? Your name is familiar though I joined in March 1993.

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    2. I left Dohuk in June 1993. I had hired engineer Assad when I left,

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  2. This is an important and revealing story. With limited resources, UNICEF helped avert a potential catastrophe on an extraordinary scale. Had a third of the sewage system of a major city collapsed, the result could have been an unmitigated public-health disaster, exposing hundreds of thousands of people to disease.

    Was headquarters aware of and supportive of this initiative, or was it, as I suspect, a pragmatic country-office response?

    The story reminds me of my time in Baghdad under the sanctions regime. A Swedish company held a valid Iraqi government contract to repair and expand several urban water-supply systems. Completing the work would have provided safe drinking water to hundreds of thousands of people, an impact far beyond anything UNICEF could have achieved. The company was being obstructed by the UN Sanctions Committee, which controlled everything entering Iraq, and I wanted UNICEF to intervene so that this essential work could go ahead. 

    Headquarters refused in no uncertain terms. I was told to “install handpumps instead.” I pointed out that Iraq was a highly urbanised country with developed water systems and that handpumps were no substitute for repairing municipal infrastructure. I also suggested that the Iraqi government would regard such an approach as inappropriate. The response was: “No one cares what the Government of Iraq thinks.”

    To complete the indignity, because the company happened to be Swedish and I was Swedish, I was accused of improper collusion, and there were suggestions of corruption. 

    I, needless to say, lost the argument. More importantly, hundreds of thousands of Iraqis lost the prospect of safe drinking water.

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  3. Thank you for your message, Thomas. You are correct in your suspicion: this was a purely programmatic, country-office response, driven by necessity on the ground rather than any directive or support from Headquarters. I’m sure you appreciate that these activities were of an emergency nature and could not afford to wait for the standard bureaucratic cycles and risk-aversion that often characterize UNICEF HQ processes. Many of the infrastructure solutions we implemented were born of pure ingenuity; engineers and local staff finding ways to do the impossible with limited resources.

    Your recollection of the Swedish company in Baghdad is a textbook example of why HQ was often sitting on a very fine borderline. The reluctance to intervene was rooted less in a lack of concern for the Iraqi people than in an institutional fear of upsetting the Security Council member states who had imposed the sanctions. It was a political calculation that prioritized diplomatic caution over humanitarian outcomes.
    You may also recall the evaluation report compiled by our colleagues from Copenhagen and the WASH team in New York. It was a thorough and, frankly, damning assessment of the constraints we faced, and Headquarters refused to publish it. The findings likely exposed the uncomfortable truth that our hands were often tied by the very bureaucracy that was supposed to support us.

    On a lighter note, your message brought a smile to my face. You were, after all, the person who recruited me into UNICEF. I am gently curious, and slightly doubtful as to whether you still remember me after all these years. Regardless, I remain grateful for the opportunity you gave me to serve.

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    Replies
    1. Of course I remember you

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    2. There is a bit of irony behind your recruitment that you may, at this point, appreciate.

      I had noticed that our Iraq Country Office didn't reflect either the ethnic or religious makeup of Iraqi society. Long before "DEI" became an official corporate buzzword, I decided to take matters into my own hands and balance things by giving hiring preference to qualified Muslim candidates, who were noticeably underrepresented.

      I knew that some Iraqi Christians carried names common across both religions, but I figured certain names were unmistakable, like Mohamed, Ali and Zaid. So when I saw Zaid, I thought: A strong Muslim candidate.

      It turned out my detective work was off base; you were Christian! But in hindsight, it turned out to be a lovely mistake. You did a stellar job.

      Delete
    3. There is a bit of irony behind your recruitment that you might, at this point, appreciate.

      I had noticed that our Iraq Country Office didn't reflect either the ethnic or religious makeup of Iraqi society. Long before "DEI" became an official corporate buzzword, I decided to take matters into my own hands and balance things by giving hiring preference to qualified Muslim candidates, who were noticeably underrepresented.

      I knew that some Iraqi Christians carried names common across both religions, but I figured certain names were unmistakable, like Mohamed, Ali and Zaid. So when I saw Zaid, I thought: A strong Muslim candidate.

      It turned out my detective work was off base; you were Christian! But in hindsight, it turned out to be a lovely mistake. You did a stellar job.

      Delete
    4. Haha. What a story! I had no idea. The irony is perfect, and I’m glad your misread name worked in my favor.

      I always considered you one of my UNICEF mentors, and I said as much in my farewell message a year ago. So thank you for taking that chance on me, even if the initial logic was slightly off.

      Warm regards to you wherever you are.

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    5. Thank you, Zaid. Your story brings back memories of the conditions in which our colleagues worked. At one point, ours was UNICEF’s, money-wise, largest operation, with 150 staff. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly dressed us down, and we were closely watched. I still remember your satellite TV dish being taken the day after you had mentioned in my office that you had one. Privacy was in short supply.

      You will also remember our report on the impact of sanctions on children. We prepared it in time for the General Assembly meeting in New York. It was a strong report: the graphs on virtually every page made the evidence hard to evade. We knew it would cause a political storm. That was when the country office needed headquarters to stand up and take some of the heat.

      Instead, we were blamed for producing the report without headquarters’ authorisation. The fax trail showing headquarters had demanded it was ignored.

      I sometimes wondered what all the 1,200 people at headquarters were there for. UNICEF had, after all, no programme on Manhattan.

      Your account is a welcome reminder of what our Iraqi colleagues accomplished despite all this. They deserved far more support than they received.

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  4. Thank you for your kind message Thomas and for still remembering those details after all these years. It means a great deal.

    There is something you may not know: many of the national staff, myself included, were called on by the intelligence people seeking silly information. The calls themselves were a constant source of worry. And while those intelligence days are gone now, the Iraq I knew then is much better than what we have now: a country that doesn't qualify to be called a state. My family and I left and never went back!

    On the report you mention, is that the one drafted by Brendan D. and Haavald S.? If so, then it is the same I referenced in my earlier message.

    I promise to share more stories about my Iraq work in the posts ahead.

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    Replies
    1. I was bugged in Sudan as well; I never worried too much about it. I never said anything about the government that was different from what I said to them. Yes, I was aware that you were pressured by security for information. The fact that there was none of any interest may have made it worse. We are referring to different reports, but the conclusions may have been similar. Where are you living? 

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    2. Toronto, Canada

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    3. Thank you!!!

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    4. Whom are you thanking???

      Delete

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