I picked it up out of curiosity. With the liberal world order fraying, Europe looking uncertain, and China on the rise, I was hoping for fresh thinking—especially on the Global South, one corner of Stubb’s triangle and arguably the most unpredictable.
At first, though, the book tested my patience. Stubb has a habit of listing the number of leaders he has met, countries he has visited, and conferences he has addressed. It quickly feels like a resume of a middle-managing UN official. His credentials are not in doubt; the name-dropping adds little.
Where he is strongest is on multilateralism. His line—“A multipolar world runs on self-interest. A multilateral world makes the common interest a self-interest”—is crisp and convincing.
His central thesis is that global multipolarity will increasingly crystallize around two major poles: the United States, representing the Global West, and China, leading what he terms the Global East. The third corner of the triangle is the Global South, a far less defined and more fluid grouping that may include actors as diverse as the Gulf states, African countries, and India. These actors, he argues, are not bound by a fixed ideological agenda and may align—temporarily or more enduringly—with either side. Nations are in competition with each other about resources, culture, technology, sports, prestige, knowledge and many other. This competition can lead to hostilities, or cooperation for the betterment of all.
In this telling, the real divide is not economic ideology. Capitalism, in one form or another, is now a near-universal operating system. Rather, the distinction lies in governance models: more liberal and democratic in the West, more state-directed in the East. Stubb tries hard to describe the motivations and strategies of these two poles.
And then, just as things get interesting, his analysis about the Global South remains comparatively thin. This is where the argument feels incomplete. No real sense of its internal fractures, its competing ambitions, or its growing confidence in setting its own terms. No serious engagement with the possibility that these countries are not just “tilting” between poles, but actively reshaping the system itself.
That gap is worth filling. Many of our former colleagues, with years of experience across the Global South, could offer more perspectives here. Not to predict the future, but to reflect more deeply on how this diverse set of countries and societies might position themselves—and how international cooperation could (and should) evolve in response.
Detlef can be contacted: detlefpalm55@gmail.com
Thanks for this - as far as UNICEF goes - we had a transition (much needed) to diversify our management to look more like the world and less like the G7. Until retired end of 2025 I had not detected that this resulted in us being more “South informed “ or thinking - we largely relied on cookie cutter CPDs steered by a global set of strategies - having more diverse managers and huge regional offices did not make us a better partner to government in most cases. we got the model wrong as to how we engage at country level / and got tangled up in dashboards, gadgets and UN reform . In the new world order we were rather clumsy in engaging with new leaders - China, Gulf countries etc. makes me wonder what the new model will look like and if UNICEF will be bold enough to raise our gaze beyond our navel and work differently? Likewise for the UN as a whole?
ReplyDeleteDetlef’s critique of Alexander Stubb might be slightly unfair, and dismissing him risks overlooking something important: he is one of the very few European leaders to articulate a framework for a world that is no longer anchored in the past. That alone sets him apart.
ReplyDeleteMore emphasis on the Global South will absolutely be needed going forward. It constitutes the majority of the world's population. The Global South is not a “third corner”; it is self-aware, it is diverse, and an opportunistic set of actors is increasingly attempting to shape the system.
Bob's reflections on UNICEF point to institutional failure. The attempt to “diversify” leadership, to make it look more like the world, might have been overdue. But representation, on its own, does not generate insight, nor does it necessarily provide a better understanding of local realities. Instead, what seems to have emerged is a more diverse system still driven by the old frameworks and internal processes.
In other words, form without much substance. This raises a fundamental question: what, exactly, is the UN system good at?
There are areas where the system has demonstrated comparative advantage, like peacekeeping, convening power and humanitarian coordination. But there are also areas where it has persistently underperformed: ineffective development programmes, duplication across agencies, and often awkward relationships with emerging powers that neither trust nor reject the system.
Rob’s observation that the UN has been “clumsy” in engaging with actors such as India, China and the Gulf states is telling. These are not peripheral players; they are central to the emerging order. Yet the institutional reflex has been to fit them into existing frameworks rather than to rethink the frameworks themselves.
Which brings us back to Stubb.
If his notion of a world where self-interest drives behaviour is correct, and multilateralism can align that self-interest with common goals, then the implication is clear: the institutions of multilateralism must themselves be redesigned to reflect the distribution of power and influence in the world as it actually is, not as it was after WWII.
This is where real reform would begin, and it can not be modest.
A credible overhaul would require consolidation across the UN system, fewer agencies, clearer mandates, and a willingness to abandon areas where impact has been minimal. It would also require a rethinking of governance structures, such as the Security Council. A body that does not meaningfully include Africa, South America, India and Indonesia or representation from the Middle East, has little legitimacy in a multipolar world.
Such changes are politically daunting, bordering on the prohibitive. But the alternative is a slow erosion of relevance.
And here Detlef may underestimate Stubb.
Leaders like Alexander Stubb, pragmatic, internationally experienced, and intellectually engaged, may be the kind of figures capable of initiating and driving these changes. His handling of figures such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin suggests diplomatic skills and strategic clarity that are in short supply.
The real challenge is not only the complexity of the issues. The world has already moved into a new phase of distributed power, but our institutions remain in an earlier era. The Global South is not waiting to be “aligned”; it is negotiating, hedging, and setting terms. Meanwhile, the multilateral system is preoccupied with its own internal issues rather than projecting external effectiveness.
Perhaps the value of Stubb’s book is the questions it leaves insufficiently addressed. Those gaps are where the next generation of thinking and action should begin.
I agree with you, Thomas, in your assessment and your recommendations for a redesign of the UN. I appreciate Stubb, although his knowledge of the Global South—as he presents it in his book—is less profound than his knowledge of Europe and the major powers.
DeleteThe Global South will eventually play its cards, at the latest when the Joker (USA), the Zombie (Russia), and the Phantom of the Opera (China) have departed. The question is how we can all, in our own small ways, support this transition.
DeleteYou suggest that the Global South will “play its cards” once actors like the US, Russia, and China have departed. These actors are not leaving. If anything, their presence across Africa and the Global South is increasing, joined by others such as the Gulf states and India. So the question is not when they leave, but how their presence can be used.
From that perspective, the Global South can rise and shape outcomes by leveraging the partners rather than aligning with one or two. In many cases, that is already happening: relationships are becoming more transactional, more selective, and more strategic. That is a quicker and more realistic path to success, rather than a delayed one after others exit.
Of course, success is not guaranteed. But if managed well, a multi-actor environment could accelerate the Global South’s ability to shape the system on its own terms.
" oh, and one more thing you aren't going to like,- what comes after America"
ReplyDeleteLeonard Cohen
"Hallelujah"
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