When we were in Albania (where I served as Deputy Representative from 2006 to 2011, and I believe Detlef Palm arrived around 2009 as my Representative), we were at the peak of a frenetic trend called Delivering as One (DAO). It was the latest attempt at UN Reform, and eight countries were selected to pilot what DAO should be. By some stroke of luck (or perhaps bad luck), I was posted in Tanzania, Albania, and Pakistan during this dizzying period. What are the chances of being assigned to three of the eight pilots in the world? Lightning striking my head twice seems more likely.
The eight pilot countries were:
Albania, Cape Verde (now Cabo Verde), Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Viet Nam.
Albania, Cape Verde (now Cabo Verde), Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay, and Viet Nam.
These pilots were designed to test the "Four Ones" approach—One Programme, One Budget, One Leader, and One Office—with "One Voice" often added as a fifth pillar. While only eight were official pilots, they were eventually joined by dozens of "voluntary adopters" as the reform expanded in subsequent years.
Anyone who knows Detlef knows that his use of logic is epic. There is no meanness, games, "cuteness," or silliness—no empty pats on the back or fake accolades. He offers only clear points backed by data. During our time in Albania, he and I pushed back on several of the more ridiculous elements of UN Reform that seemed to land in our laps every other day. This "push" was ushered in by the One Leader: the newly empowered UN Resident Coordinator (UNRC).
I won’t get into all the absurdities we had to cope with—none of which did anything to improve the lives of children or help the UN work better together—but one moment remains crystal clear. It was a lively discussion within the UN Country Team (UNCT) regarding how the One Fund would be divided. A handful of like-minded donors had placed their money into the UN Multi-Donor Trust Fund mechanism, and each of the eight pilots had its own "Coherence Fund."
The UNRC presided over how these funds were used. In Albania, they joined forces with the donor coordination unit of the Prime Minister’s Office—a position, ironically, wholly funded by the UNDP to enhance government-led coordination. Together, the UNRC and this unit reviewed proposals from various UN agencies competing for this new One Fund and allocated money to the "winners."
To make a long story short, the UNRC used the One Fund to sprinkle "dribs and drabs" of funding across all 14 UN agencies present in Albania—and even some that were not present (yes - we had non-resident agencies). In exchange for this drip-feeding of funds, these agencies—many of which had only one staff member or none at all—received an equal vote on the UNCT. A small agency with $200,000 from the One Fund and no other resources held the same vote as UNICEF, with our $8 million budget and 20 staff members.
What added salt to the wound was that UNICEF actually lost funds when this new system was created. The donors who contributed to the One Fund (the UK, Scandinavians, Dutch, etc.) would no longer fund us directly; they directed us to seek money from the UNRC. However, rather than the donor assessing the merit of our proposal or our track record, these funds were distributed to any agency that could submit a two-page pitch and pledge to support the UNRC whenever a "consensus" was needed.
The moment that perfectly illustrated how ridiculous this had become occurred during a UNCT meeting where agencies were bickering over allocations. Small agencies with no track record had money "falling on their heads," while larger agencies like UNICEF—with planned Country Programme Documents (CPDs) and proven results—had a lower chance of receiving even a few drops of the fund.
At about this time, the UK Government released its Multilateral Aid Review (MAR). Its goal was to provide:
"...a comprehensive overview of the strengths and weaknesses of each multilateral organisation. It critically examines both the organisations’ aims and objectives and how effective they are in achieving them and delivering results..."
"...a comprehensive overview of the strengths and weaknesses of each multilateral organisation. It critically examines both the organisations’ aims and objectives and how effective they are in achieving them and delivering results..."
Detlef prepared well for every UNCT meeting with the necessary data. He arrived with the preliminary results of this UK study, which showed that most of the agencies at our table had received failing marks. He soberly pointed out that while the UK could not fund most of these agencies directly due to poor performance and low value for money, those same agencies were now receiving UK funds "through the back door" via the One Fund—without any review of their delivery capacity. He showed the graph where high-performing multilaterals were in the green (upper right) and low-performing ones were in the red (lower left).
The room went silent, but only for a moment. Detlef didn't bring this up to be mean-spirited; he was trying to use logic to urge the UN toward a performance-based allocation system. His logic fell largely on deaf ears. The RC wanted to sprinkle the funds, and the agencies were happy to lap them up without scrutiny.I was in awe of Detlef’s calm, logical approach—and equally in awe of how the UNCT turned its back on that logic to return to "business as usual." I endured another year of the pilot in Albania and several more in Pakistan. In total, nine years of my career were mired in DAO pilots where we spent excessive amounts of time toying with ways to be "coherent." Those are nine years I will never get back. I can't help but think the waning confidence of donors in the UN was at least partly fueled by this limp effort to reform—an effort that could not stand up to simple logic.
To this day, agencies still fight over allocations. It can be so frustrating.
ReplyDeleteIndeed it was frustrating. But what made it so extra annoying was we would normally attract those funds based on our track record with those same donors who funded the ONE FUND. Often times trust was built up over years of collaboration - joint field visits with that donor, joint meetings with government on status, reports, evaluations - but all that was thrown out the window so the UNRC and some hired UNDP expert could allocate funds based on nothing more than a 2 page proposal.
ReplyDeleteThe most frustrating aspect of this story (thanks, Rob, for the kudos) was the obliviousness of regional offices, concerned divisions and UNICEF senior management towards the direction of the reform, which turned the UN development system into an even bigger bureaucratic monster than it already was.
ReplyDeleteAny analysis sent from UNICEF Albania was ignored, emails were not even acknowledged, help in negotiations with the RC was never offered, interagency evaluation glossed over the troubles. ‘Delivering as One’ failed spectacularly, and nobody drew a lesson. As a pilot, we never were invited to a serious debate by HQ, and I can only conclude that UN reform was never seriously debated by top management.
It is not only about how to get or distribute funding among UN agencies. It was about the purpose of the UN Development System, and the best use of its resources.
I tried to capture many lessons here: Rethinking UNICEF. Many thought it was a good laugh, and continued to strut along without change of course, until the funding crash came. Even now, they seem to be strutting along in the same old direction….
Furthemore ,I continued with UNICEF for another 5 years after the UN stopped piloting and tinkering --based on what they 'learned' from 8 pilots (how was that learning done??) they rolled out the new reforms that all UN country teams had to adhere to. It came out as guidance, tools and with a slew of UNRCs and staff to "implement". Furthermore, each UN agency agreed that every grants from our donors would have a "coordination levy" of 1 % that would go to the UNRC system. They have raked in MILLIONS from that. UNRC offices worldwide exploded with coordination staff - partnerships, coordinations, M&E , comms and even economists. Ironically, as UN agencies cut 1000s of staff due to budget cuts - UNRC offices grew and grew. In one of the South Pacific Island countries - the UNRC office was larger than any of the UN agencies that they were supposed to coordinate. I would often sit in coordination meetings (there were many ) while I was in Fiji and the majority of the UN staff in those meetings were UNRC staff - not staff of UN agencies. Completely insane - I don't see how this could turn out good for the UN. The UNRC system brings nothing to the table - they don't help manage overlaps or agencies, they don't help fill gaps, they don't raise funds (The ONE FUND experience was a colossal flop - no donors do this now) and they create more work for UN staff in shrinking agencies by creating new frameworks, asking inputs for the UNRC equivalent of RAM (UNINFO), forcing proposals for joint programs, and asking for UN inputs to the UNRC annual report - for which no one knows who is the audience. One of my motivations to retire abit early was to get out from under the UNRC system yoke - it was crushing UN agencies and became a treadmill we all had to run on chasing a proverbial carrot on a stick that grew longer and longer as the carrot wilted in the heat and a bite of the wilted carrot was ever elusive.
ReplyDeleteReading this, you can not escape the conclusion that the system’s present “funding crisis” was not imposed from the outside, but carefully engineered from within over many years. We built layer upon layer of coordination, reform, and oversight. Each layer was vigorously defended in the name of coherence, none improved delivery, and Africa fell further behind.
ReplyDeleteFor a long time, the system proved remarkably resilient at sustaining this arrangement. Budgets held, structures grew, and dissent was effectively suppressed. But the truth has a way of asserting itself eventually.
When the cuts finally came, they were treated as an external shock. In reality, they looked rather more like a delayed invoice for services largely rendered to ourselves.
How do we, with this background, save our wonderful organisation?
First off, review the entire constellation of UN agencies - probably 80% add no value at all and are not even sustainable or logical and with many overlapping mandates many can be consolidated. Take for instance the merge of UNIFEM and 2 other gender related Un entities around 2010ish. At that time there was much hand wringing about how this would dilute and bring to an end UNs work on gender. Well , they were merged and guess what - the work continued under UN Women. We tend to get worked up over turf like the world will come to an end of Agency X or pet project Y is dropped or scaled back. Also eliminate the clunky UNRC system - and have UN coordination be a rotating chair at country level. Next up: NO MORE regional offices of any kind. If we want to interact with regional bodies - insert a few staff into that body to lobby or add inputs. Lastly, review the range of programs - how many sectors as UNICEF we want to engage and in how many different countries. Thise few things would drastically reduce the size and appetite of the beast - and then we can see if we can reduce the invoice.
DeletePerhaps it would help if UNICEF hired professional managers as opposed to promoting nutritionists, anthropologists and generalists into managerial positions.
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