On Russia's Invasion to Ukraine: Yuriy Dzhygyr - shared by Nuzhat Shahzadi

Nuzhat shares an article by Yuriy is a former deputy Minister of Defense, Ukraine. Yuriy was a Unicef consultant before the war and they met in Kiribati when he did some work for UNICEF. She says: Yuriy has recently penned an article (for King’s College, UK) on the war in Ukraine- more of an analysis. He shared it with me. It’s a good piece.

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Background

Russia’s full-scale invasion was a massive escalation of existing conflict. Tensions date back to Soviet Union’s collapse, when independent Ukraine sought closer ties with Western institutions while Russia viewed Ukraine as falling within its sphere of influence. Ukraine’s internal politics often reflected this tug-of-war: pro-European movements (e.g. 1990 Revolution on Granite, 2004 Orange Revolution, and 2014 Revolution of Dignity) challenged leaders favoring Moscow. In 2014, after Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity ousted a pro-Russian government, Russia annexed Crimea and instigated a quasi-separatist insurgency in eastern part of Ukraine. That 2014–2021 conflict left thousands dead and parts of Luhansk and Donetsk regions under Russian control. Multiple ceasefire agreements failed to achieve a lasting political settlement.

Root Causes 

The debate surrounding causes for Russia’s full-scale military invasion to Ukraine encompasses various perspectives and theories. Key points in discussion include: 1) geopolitical factors (desire to reassert its influence in former Soviet territories, viewing Ukraine's westward alignment with NATO and EU as a direct threat to its national security) (Mearsheimer, 2022); 2) historical context (grievances stemming from dissolution of Soviet Union and perceived obligation to protect Russian-speaking populations in Ukraine) (Motyl, 2023); 3) domestic politics (consolidating power under President Putin, diverting attention from domestic issues, and rallying nationalist sentiment) (Kramer, 2022) (Stoner, 2022); 4) strategic objectives (need to secure military and economic interests, including control over energy resources and transit routes) (Götz, 2015); 5) eschatological beliefs (opinions that confronting Ukraine (and the West) is necessary for fulfilling Russia's historical destiny) (Pynnöniemi & Parppei, 2024) (Umland, 2017).

These perspectives offer valuable insights into analysis of specific groups of causes. Building on this, integrated, multi-causal explanation of Russian decision to attack Ukraine was proposed. This model employed theoretical approach categorizing all causes into three groups (Nye, 2003) – deep (strategic and civilizational importance of Ukraine to Russia), intermediate (erosion of Russian influence over Ukraine), and proximate (misguided estimate of Ukrainian capacity to resist). (Götz & and Ekman, 2024).

The first group may be considered as underlaying factors of war, while the third group can be seen as its triggers. The second group does not represent either underlying causes or direct triggers. Rather, these additional factors act as catalyzers or inhibitors. Although they are highly influential, they primarily affect the intensity and dynamics of war, rather than existence of an interstate conflict.

Underlying Cause 

Eschatological, generally anti-western - and specifically, radically anti-Ukrainian - believes are deeply rooted within Russian political, military, and diplomatic establishment. This rhetoric became an integral part not only of Russian foreign and security policies, but also of broader public debate. “Arguably, they are starting to assume a life of their own”. (Umland, 2017). These believes stem from Pan Slavic and Eurasianist quasi-philosophical constructs of nineteenth century. According to them, Russia represents distinct Eurasian civilization, which is illiberal, non-democratic, anti-individualistic, and which is separate and opposite to Western civilization. Eurasianists generally view Ukraine as inseparable part of larger Eurasian civilization. They reject its sovereignty, claiming its Western alignment as geopolitical threat to Russia. They oppose Ukraine’s integration with NATO and EU, framing it as a Western project to weaken Russia. Many support fragmentation of Ukraine and emphasize Ukraine's historical ties to Russia through Orthodox and Imperial identity. Ultimately, they advocate for Russian dominance over Ukraine as part of a broader effort to establish a multipolar world order opposed to Western influence.

Ivan Ilyin was one of the most prominent figures in this discourse, and his views are deeply admired by Putin. (Snyder, 2018). Putin often publicly referred and cited Ilyin’s opinions in context of Russian–Ukrainian war, using his ideas to justify Russian expansionism and opposition to Ukraine’s sovereignty, reinforcing the narrative that Ukraine is inseparable part of "Russian World" and should not align with West.

This ideological indoctrination of Putin and of broader strand of Russian political mainstream resulted in eschatological treatment of war with Ukraine as a clash of civilizations to deter Ukraine’s Western orientation and perception of independent Ukraine as “anti-Russia”. This approach has been fueled by a sense of historical injustice and a desire to regain what is recepted as lost influence and territories in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union”. (Snyder, 2018). In a recent interview, key Putin’s advisor stated that Russian objectives in war remained the same - "military or diplomatic crushing of Ukraine" and "division of this artificial quasi-state into its natural fragments.". He emphasized: “There may be maneuvers, slowdowns, or interruptions along the way. But this goal will be achieved.” (@LEXPRESS, 2025).

Conclusion 

Within this ideological context, Russia continues to pursue total subjugation of Ukraine, systematic destruction of Ukrainian political institutions, and coercion of Ukrainians to return to alleged roots of Russian civilization. “In practice, as we have seen in the occupied regions of Ukraine, this means destruction of Ukrainian cultural artefacts, prohibition of Ukrainian language (especially in schools), indoctrination of children by the Russian school system and filtration of active Ukrainian citizens and subjection of them to torture and death.” (Pynnöniemi & Parppei, 2024).

In short-term, shift in Russia’s ideological doctrine - which denies the very existence of a sovereign Ukraine – appears unlikely. Given that this fundamental underlying cause of war cannot be feasibly altered in the short-term, a sustainable peace agreement remains improbable. Therefore, in an environment of extreme asymmetry in capabilities, Ukraine needs multi-layered deterrence strategy that combines strong military posture with diplomatic efforts and international economic sanctions.

Such strategy would imply a broad range of policies. Nonetheless, three courses of action are the most critical for the purpose of long-term deterrence:

1) Continued delivery of arms as an instrument of deterrence by denial. (Lupovici, 2023). Providing weapons to Ukraine - and committing to sustained deliveries - will enhance the country’s ability to fight and defend itself. It will signal that Russia would not be able to achieve its goals and that, therefore, further escalation is useless.

2) Provision of broad legally binding security guarantees as an instrument of deterrence by punishment. (Palacio, 2024) Even if full NATO membership is postponed and the possibility of temporary partition of Ukraine becomes imminent, the establishment of alternative security guarantees will be crucial.

3) Internal strengthening of systems, institutions, and rules. (Applebaum, 2024). This will help to strengthen institutional resilience and to maximize transparent and efficient use of limited resources.

References:

• @LEXPRESS. (2025). EXCLUSIVE. Vladislav Sourkov, the wizard of the Kremlin : "Russia will expand in all directions, as far as God wills".
• Applebaum, A. (2024). How Ukraine Must Change If It Wants to Win.
• Götz, E. (2015). It's geopolitics, stupid: explaining Russia's Ukraine policy. Global Affairs, 1(1), 3–10.
• Götz, E., & and Ekman, P. (2024). Russia’s War Against Ukraine: Context, Causes, and Consequences. Problems of Post-Communism, 71(3), 193–205. https://doi.org/10.1080/10758216.2024.2343640
• Kramer, D. J. (2022). Defeating Putin in Ukraine Is Vital to the Future of Democracy. Journal of Democracy.
• Lupovici, A. (2023). Deterrence by delivery of arms: NATO and the war in Ukraine. Contemporary Security Policy, 44(4), 624–641. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2023.2256572
• Mearsheimer, J. J. (2022). The causes and consequences of the Ukraine war. Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development(21), 12–27.
• Motyl, A. (2023). It’s Not NATO–Putin Always Has Had Expansionist Designs. The Hill.
• Nye, J. S. (2003). Understanding international conflicts: An introduction to theory and history. (No Title).
• Palacio, A. (2024). Ukraine Needs Security Guarantees | by Ana Palacio - Project Syndicate.
• Pynnöniemi, K., & Parppei, K. (2024). Understanding Russia’s war against Ukraine: Political, eschatological and cataclysmic dimensions. Journal of Strategic Studies, 47(6-7), 832–859. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2024.2379395
• Snyder, T. (2018). Ivan Ilyin, Putin’s philosopher of Russian fascism. The New York Review of Books, 16.
• Stoner, K. (2022). The Putin Puzzle: Why Ukraine? Why Now? Wall Street Journal, 14.
• Umland, A. (2017). Post-Soviet Neo-Eurasianism, the Putin System, and the Contemporary European Extreme Right. Perspectives on Politics, 15(2), 465–476. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592717000135