Editor's Note: William Calley died on April 28, 2024. In March 1968 in the midst of the US war in Vietnam, US Lt. William Calley led American soldiers who killed 504 unresisting civilians, mostly women, children and elderly men, in My Lai and a neighboring community. The news reports and photos of the massacre later became a major factor in turning the American public against the war.
In the article below John Gilmartin explains his experiences during training in Officer Candidate School (OCS) in the wake of Calley's courts-marshall and conviction.
John also attaches the letter a young soldier recently returned from Vietanam, Ron Ridenhour, sent to then President Nixon, members of the cabinet, and members of Congress. That letter set off the investigation and trial of Calley and 20 soldiers. As John explains, only Calley was convicted and his sentence was eventually reduced to house arrest. No senior officers were ever charged for their involvement.
I cannot explain Calley or the war or how the army covered up the killing. But, I think it's useful for xunicef to know something about what happened and the context of that school. Thanks, John
Here below is a copy of the original letter to a congressmen that began the exposure of the My Lai massacre in March 1968. The only soldier/officer charged and convicted of this crime was second lieutenant William Calley, a fellow graduate of the Infantry OCS in Fort Benning, in Columbus Georgia.
Calley has been discovered to have died quietly with no outside notice recently. He was convicted of directly murdering over 20 Vietnamese civilians or non combatants in My Lai, and served less than three years confinement to house arrest at Fort Benning. His original life sentence was first reduced to ten years and then after three years in home arrest he was released and became a civilian who owned a jewelry shop in Columbus GA, the same town Ft Benning neighbors.
I was in OCS at Benning from January to July 1970. My class began with 200 men who had all volunteered to attend the six month course to become a second lieutenant of infantry. Of that 200 who started 100 graduated. Those who quit the course early were immediately assigned to infantry companies already in Vietnam. We were told this from day one as an incentive for us to finish the course. We were all in excellent physical condition at the start of the course because we had all just finished six months of basic and advanced infantry training. All of us were college graduates. To my knowledge of all the men in our company, no one wanted to go to Vietnam and be part of the war that had been raging for years by that time. A small part of our training included detailed briefing on the Calley case, and focused on every soldier and officer's instruction and obligation to NOT follow an illegal order. By the time I was in OCS the Calley case had already been heard and decided.
We didn't sit around the barracks and discuss Calley, and none of us ever observed him on the base. Actually in six months there we never sat around the barracks. It was the most demanding full time instruction I ever experienced. Our performance in leadership roles was evaluated every three days in face to face peer and superior officer critiques. All of the platoon members I knew closely who resigned the course did so because of peer pressure and officer critiques of our performance. I do remember the Calley story and conviction as something that hung over the morale of the entire school. None of us ever discussed it that I can recall. It was simply a disgrace we had to take with us.
As a young second lieutenant assigned to be a platoon leader one of my recurring duties was instructing on Not following illegal orders. How to decide what might be illegal, how to report that event, and what was the soldier and platoon leaders obligation to do when / if they found themselves in that situation. It was always an interesting days work to conduct that class. We had a small handout for the troops, and a small instruction guide to read before beginnning.
Letter from Ron Ridenhour to President Nixon, Members of the Cabinet, Members of Congress
Mr. Ron Ridenhour
1416 East Thomas Road #104
Phoenix, Arizona
March 29, 1969
Gentlemen:
It was late in April, 1968 that I first heard of "Pinkville" and what allegedly happened there. I received that first report with some skepticism, but in the following months I was to hear similar stories from such a wide variety of people that it became impossible for me to disbelieve that something rather dark and bloody did indeed occur sometime in March, 1968 in a village called "Pinkville" in the Republic of Viet Nam.
The circumstances that led to my having access to the reports I'm about to relate need explanation. I was inducted in March, 1967 into the U. S. Army. After receiving various training I was assigned to the 70th Infantry Detachment (LRP), 1lth Light Infantry Brigade at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in early October, 1967. That unit, the 70th Infantry Detachennt (LRP), was disbanded a week before the llth Brigade shipped out for Viet Nam on the 5th of December, 1967. All of the man from whom I later heard reports of the "Pinkville" incident were reassigned to "C" Company, lst Battalion, 20th Infantry, llth Light Infantry Brigade. I was reassigned to the aviation section of Headquarters Headquarters Company llth LIB. After we had been in Viet Nam for 3 to 4 months many of the men from the 70th Inf. Det. (LRP) began to transfer into the same unit, "E" Company, 51st Infantry (LRP).
In late April, 1968 I was awaiting orders for a transfer from HHC, llth Brigade to Company "E," 51st Inf, (LRP), when I happened to run into Pfc "Butch" Gruver, whom I had known in Hawaii. Gruver told me he had been assigned to "C" Company lst of the 20th until April lst when he transferred to the unit that I was headed for. During the course of our conversation he told me the first of many reports I was to hear of "Pinkville."
"Charlie" Company 1/20 had been assigned to Task Force Barker in late February, 1968 to help conduct "search and destroy" operations on the Batangan Peninsula, Barker's area of operation. The task force was operating out of L. F. Dottie, located five or six miles north of Quang Nhai city on Viet Namese National Highway 1. Gruver said that Charlie Company had sustained casualties; primarily from mines and booby traps, almost everyday from the first day they arrived on the peninsula. One village area was particularly troublesome and seemed to be infested with booby traps and enemy soldiers. It was located about six miles northeast of Quang Nh,ai city at approximate coordinates B.S. 728795. It was a notorious area and the men of Task Force Barker had a special name I for it: they called it "Pinkville." One morning in the latter part of March, Task Force Barker moved out from its firebase headed for "Pinkville." Its mission: destroy the trouble spot and all of its inhabitants.
When "Butch" told me this I didn't quite believe that what he was telling me was true, but he assured me that it was and went on to describe what had happened. The other two companies that made up the task force cordoned off the village so that "Charlie" Company could move through to destroy the structures and kill the inhabitants. Any villagers who ran from Charlie Company were stopped by the encircling companies. I asked "Butch" several times if all the people were killed. He said that he thought they were men, women and children. He recalled seeing a small boy, about three or four years old, standing by the trail with a gunshot wound in one arm. The boy was clutching his wounded arm with his other hand, while blood trickled between his fingers. He was staring around himself in shock and disbelief at what he saw. "He just stood there with big eyes staring around like he didn't understand; he didn't believe wh.at was happening. Then the captain's RTO (radio operator) put a burst of 16 (M-16 rifle) fire into him." It was so bad, Gruver said, that one of the men in his squad shot himself in the foot in order to be medivaced out of the area so that he would not have to participate in the slaughter. Although he had not seen it, Gruver had been told by people he considered trustworthy that one of the company's officers, 2nd Lieutenant Kally (this spelling may be incorrect) had rounded up several groups of villagers (each group consisting of a minimum of 20 persons of both sexes and all ages). According to the story, Kally then machine-gunned each group. Gruver estimated that the population of the village had been 300 to 400 people and that very few, if any, escaped.
After hearing this account I couldn't quite accept it. Somehow I just couldn't believe that not only had so many young American men participated in such an act of barbarism, but that their officers had ordered it. There were other men in the unit I was soon to be assigned to, "E" Company, 51st Infantry (LRP), who had been in Charlie Company at the time that Gruver alleged the incident at "Pinkville" had occurred. I became determined to ask them about "Pinkville" so that I might compare, their accounts with Pfc Gruver's.
When I arrived at "Echo" Company, 51st Infantry (LRP) the first men I looked for were Pfcs Michael Terry, and William Doherty. Both were veterans of "Charlie" Company, 1/20 and "Pinkville." Instead of contradicting "Butch" Gruver's story they corroborated it, adding some tasty tidbits of information of their own. Terry and-Doherty had been in the same, squad and their platoon was the third platoon of "C" Company to pass through. the village. Most of the people they Came to were already dead. Those that weren't were sought out and shot. The platoon left nothing alive neither livestock nor people. Around noon the two soldiers' squad stopped to eat. "Billy and I started to get out our chow" Terry said, "but close to us was a bunch of Vietnamese in a heap, and some of them were moaning. Kally (2nd Lt. Kally) had been through before us and all of them had been shot, but many weren't dead. It was obvious that they weren't going to get any medical attention so Billy and I got up and went over to where they were. I guess we sort of finished them off." Terry went on to say that he and Doherty then returned to where their packs were and ate lunch. He estimated the size oif the village to be 200 to 300 people. Doherty thought that the population of "Pinkville had been 400 people.
If Terry, Doherty and Gruver could be believed, then not only had "Charlie" Company received orders to slaughter all the inhabitants of the village, but those orders had come from the commanding officer of Task Force Barker, or possibly even higher in the chain of command. Pfc Terry stated that when Captain Medina (Charlie Company's commanding officer Captain Ernest Medina) issued the order for the destruction of "Pinkville" he had been hesitant, as if it were something he didn't want to do but had to. Others I spoke to concurred with Terry on this.
It was June before I spoke to anyone who had something of significance to add to what I had alreadybeen told of the "Pinkville" incident. It was the end of June, 1968 when I ran into Sargent Larry La Croix at the USO in Chu Lai. La Croix had been in 2nd Lt. Kally's platoon on the day Task Force Barker swept through "Pinkville." What he told me verified the stories of the others, but he also had something new to add. He had been a witness to Kally's gunning down at least three separate groups of villagers. "It was terrible. They were slaughtering villagers like so many sheep." Kally's men were dragging people out of bunkers and hootches and putting them together in a group. The people in the group were men, women and children of all ages. As soon as he felt that the group was big enough, Kally ordered a M-60 (machine gun) set up and the people killed. La Croix said that he bore witness to this procedure at least three times. The three groups were of different sizes, one of about twenty people, one of about thirty people and one of about 40 people. When the first group was put together Kally ordered Pfc. Torres to man the machine-gun and open fire on the villagers that had been grouped together. This Torres did, but before everyone in the group was sown he ceased fire and refused to fire again. After ordering Torres to recommence firing several times, Lieutenant Kally took over the M-60 and finished shooting the remaining villagers in that first group himself. Sargent La Croix told me that Kally didn't bother to order anyone to take the machine-gun when the other two groups of villagers were formed. He simply manned it himself and shot down all villagers in both groups.
This account of Sargent La Croix's confirmed the rumors that Gruver, Terry and Doherty had previously told me about Lieutenant Kally. It also convinced me that there was a very substantial amount of truth to the stories that all of these men had told. If I needed more convincing, I was about to receive it.
It was in the middle of November, 1968 just a few weeks before I was to return to the United States for separation from the army that I talked to Pfc Michael Bernhardt. Bernhardt had served his entire year in Viet Nam in "Charlie" Company 1/20 and he too was about to go home. "Bernie" substantiated the tales told by the other men I had talked to in vivid, bloody detail and added this. "Bernie" had absolutely refused to take part in the massacre of the villagers of "Pinkville" that morning and he thought that it was rather strange that the officers of the company had not made an issue of it. But that evening "Medina (Captain Ernest Medina) came up to me ("Bernie") and told me not to do anything stupid like write my congressman" about what had happened that day. Bernhardt assured Captain Medina that he had no such thing in mind. He had nine months left in Viet Nam and felt that it was dangerous enough just fighting the acknowledged enemy.
Exactly what did, in fact, occur in the village of "Pinkville" in March, 1968 I do not know for certain, but I am convinced that it was something very black indeed. I remain irrevocably persuaded that if you and I do truly believe in the principles, of justice and the equality of every man, however humble, before the law, that form the very backbone that this country is founded on, then we must press forward a widespread and public investigation of this matter with all our combined efforts. I think that it was Winston Churchill who, once said "A country without a conscience is a country without a soul, and a country without a soul is a country that cannot survive." I feel that I must take some positive action on this matter. I hope that you will launch an investigation immediately and keep me informed of your progress. If you cannot, then I don't know what other course of action to take.
I have considered sending this to newspapers, magazines and broadcasting companies, but I somehow feel that investigation and action by the Congress of the United States is the appropriate procedure, and as a conscientious citizen I have no desire to further besmirch the image of the American serviceman in the eyes of the world. I feel that this action, while probably it would promote attention, would not bring about the constructive actions that the direct actions of the Congre.ss of the United States would.
Sincerely,
/s/ Ron Ridenhour
.........
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| Lt. Calley in 1969 |
I cannot explain Calley or the war or how the army covered up the killing. But, I think it's useful for xunicef to know something about what happened and the context of that school. Thanks, John
Here below is a copy of the original letter to a congressmen that began the exposure of the My Lai massacre in March 1968. The only soldier/officer charged and convicted of this crime was second lieutenant William Calley, a fellow graduate of the Infantry OCS in Fort Benning, in Columbus Georgia.
Calley has been discovered to have died quietly with no outside notice recently. He was convicted of directly murdering over 20 Vietnamese civilians or non combatants in My Lai, and served less than three years confinement to house arrest at Fort Benning. His original life sentence was first reduced to ten years and then after three years in home arrest he was released and became a civilian who owned a jewelry shop in Columbus GA, the same town Ft Benning neighbors.
I was in OCS at Benning from January to July 1970. My class began with 200 men who had all volunteered to attend the six month course to become a second lieutenant of infantry. Of that 200 who started 100 graduated. Those who quit the course early were immediately assigned to infantry companies already in Vietnam. We were told this from day one as an incentive for us to finish the course. We were all in excellent physical condition at the start of the course because we had all just finished six months of basic and advanced infantry training. All of us were college graduates. To my knowledge of all the men in our company, no one wanted to go to Vietnam and be part of the war that had been raging for years by that time. A small part of our training included detailed briefing on the Calley case, and focused on every soldier and officer's instruction and obligation to NOT follow an illegal order. By the time I was in OCS the Calley case had already been heard and decided.
We didn't sit around the barracks and discuss Calley, and none of us ever observed him on the base. Actually in six months there we never sat around the barracks. It was the most demanding full time instruction I ever experienced. Our performance in leadership roles was evaluated every three days in face to face peer and superior officer critiques. All of the platoon members I knew closely who resigned the course did so because of peer pressure and officer critiques of our performance. I do remember the Calley story and conviction as something that hung over the morale of the entire school. None of us ever discussed it that I can recall. It was simply a disgrace we had to take with us.
As a young second lieutenant assigned to be a platoon leader one of my recurring duties was instructing on Not following illegal orders. How to decide what might be illegal, how to report that event, and what was the soldier and platoon leaders obligation to do when / if they found themselves in that situation. It was always an interesting days work to conduct that class. We had a small handout for the troops, and a small instruction guide to read before beginnning.
Letter from Ron Ridenhour to President Nixon, Members of the Cabinet, Members of Congress
Mr. Ron Ridenhour
1416 East Thomas Road #104
Phoenix, Arizona
March 29, 1969
Gentlemen:
It was late in April, 1968 that I first heard of "Pinkville" and what allegedly happened there. I received that first report with some skepticism, but in the following months I was to hear similar stories from such a wide variety of people that it became impossible for me to disbelieve that something rather dark and bloody did indeed occur sometime in March, 1968 in a village called "Pinkville" in the Republic of Viet Nam.
The circumstances that led to my having access to the reports I'm about to relate need explanation. I was inducted in March, 1967 into the U. S. Army. After receiving various training I was assigned to the 70th Infantry Detachment (LRP), 1lth Light Infantry Brigade at Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, in early October, 1967. That unit, the 70th Infantry Detachennt (LRP), was disbanded a week before the llth Brigade shipped out for Viet Nam on the 5th of December, 1967. All of the man from whom I later heard reports of the "Pinkville" incident were reassigned to "C" Company, lst Battalion, 20th Infantry, llth Light Infantry Brigade. I was reassigned to the aviation section of Headquarters Headquarters Company llth LIB. After we had been in Viet Nam for 3 to 4 months many of the men from the 70th Inf. Det. (LRP) began to transfer into the same unit, "E" Company, 51st Infantry (LRP).
In late April, 1968 I was awaiting orders for a transfer from HHC, llth Brigade to Company "E," 51st Inf, (LRP), when I happened to run into Pfc "Butch" Gruver, whom I had known in Hawaii. Gruver told me he had been assigned to "C" Company lst of the 20th until April lst when he transferred to the unit that I was headed for. During the course of our conversation he told me the first of many reports I was to hear of "Pinkville."
"Charlie" Company 1/20 had been assigned to Task Force Barker in late February, 1968 to help conduct "search and destroy" operations on the Batangan Peninsula, Barker's area of operation. The task force was operating out of L. F. Dottie, located five or six miles north of Quang Nhai city on Viet Namese National Highway 1. Gruver said that Charlie Company had sustained casualties; primarily from mines and booby traps, almost everyday from the first day they arrived on the peninsula. One village area was particularly troublesome and seemed to be infested with booby traps and enemy soldiers. It was located about six miles northeast of Quang Nh,ai city at approximate coordinates B.S. 728795. It was a notorious area and the men of Task Force Barker had a special name I for it: they called it "Pinkville." One morning in the latter part of March, Task Force Barker moved out from its firebase headed for "Pinkville." Its mission: destroy the trouble spot and all of its inhabitants.
When "Butch" told me this I didn't quite believe that what he was telling me was true, but he assured me that it was and went on to describe what had happened. The other two companies that made up the task force cordoned off the village so that "Charlie" Company could move through to destroy the structures and kill the inhabitants. Any villagers who ran from Charlie Company were stopped by the encircling companies. I asked "Butch" several times if all the people were killed. He said that he thought they were men, women and children. He recalled seeing a small boy, about three or four years old, standing by the trail with a gunshot wound in one arm. The boy was clutching his wounded arm with his other hand, while blood trickled between his fingers. He was staring around himself in shock and disbelief at what he saw. "He just stood there with big eyes staring around like he didn't understand; he didn't believe wh.at was happening. Then the captain's RTO (radio operator) put a burst of 16 (M-16 rifle) fire into him." It was so bad, Gruver said, that one of the men in his squad shot himself in the foot in order to be medivaced out of the area so that he would not have to participate in the slaughter. Although he had not seen it, Gruver had been told by people he considered trustworthy that one of the company's officers, 2nd Lieutenant Kally (this spelling may be incorrect) had rounded up several groups of villagers (each group consisting of a minimum of 20 persons of both sexes and all ages). According to the story, Kally then machine-gunned each group. Gruver estimated that the population of the village had been 300 to 400 people and that very few, if any, escaped.
After hearing this account I couldn't quite accept it. Somehow I just couldn't believe that not only had so many young American men participated in such an act of barbarism, but that their officers had ordered it. There were other men in the unit I was soon to be assigned to, "E" Company, 51st Infantry (LRP), who had been in Charlie Company at the time that Gruver alleged the incident at "Pinkville" had occurred. I became determined to ask them about "Pinkville" so that I might compare, their accounts with Pfc Gruver's.
When I arrived at "Echo" Company, 51st Infantry (LRP) the first men I looked for were Pfcs Michael Terry, and William Doherty. Both were veterans of "Charlie" Company, 1/20 and "Pinkville." Instead of contradicting "Butch" Gruver's story they corroborated it, adding some tasty tidbits of information of their own. Terry and-Doherty had been in the same, squad and their platoon was the third platoon of "C" Company to pass through. the village. Most of the people they Came to were already dead. Those that weren't were sought out and shot. The platoon left nothing alive neither livestock nor people. Around noon the two soldiers' squad stopped to eat. "Billy and I started to get out our chow" Terry said, "but close to us was a bunch of Vietnamese in a heap, and some of them were moaning. Kally (2nd Lt. Kally) had been through before us and all of them had been shot, but many weren't dead. It was obvious that they weren't going to get any medical attention so Billy and I got up and went over to where they were. I guess we sort of finished them off." Terry went on to say that he and Doherty then returned to where their packs were and ate lunch. He estimated the size oif the village to be 200 to 300 people. Doherty thought that the population of "Pinkville had been 400 people.
If Terry, Doherty and Gruver could be believed, then not only had "Charlie" Company received orders to slaughter all the inhabitants of the village, but those orders had come from the commanding officer of Task Force Barker, or possibly even higher in the chain of command. Pfc Terry stated that when Captain Medina (Charlie Company's commanding officer Captain Ernest Medina) issued the order for the destruction of "Pinkville" he had been hesitant, as if it were something he didn't want to do but had to. Others I spoke to concurred with Terry on this.
It was June before I spoke to anyone who had something of significance to add to what I had alreadybeen told of the "Pinkville" incident. It was the end of June, 1968 when I ran into Sargent Larry La Croix at the USO in Chu Lai. La Croix had been in 2nd Lt. Kally's platoon on the day Task Force Barker swept through "Pinkville." What he told me verified the stories of the others, but he also had something new to add. He had been a witness to Kally's gunning down at least three separate groups of villagers. "It was terrible. They were slaughtering villagers like so many sheep." Kally's men were dragging people out of bunkers and hootches and putting them together in a group. The people in the group were men, women and children of all ages. As soon as he felt that the group was big enough, Kally ordered a M-60 (machine gun) set up and the people killed. La Croix said that he bore witness to this procedure at least three times. The three groups were of different sizes, one of about twenty people, one of about thirty people and one of about 40 people. When the first group was put together Kally ordered Pfc. Torres to man the machine-gun and open fire on the villagers that had been grouped together. This Torres did, but before everyone in the group was sown he ceased fire and refused to fire again. After ordering Torres to recommence firing several times, Lieutenant Kally took over the M-60 and finished shooting the remaining villagers in that first group himself. Sargent La Croix told me that Kally didn't bother to order anyone to take the machine-gun when the other two groups of villagers were formed. He simply manned it himself and shot down all villagers in both groups.
This account of Sargent La Croix's confirmed the rumors that Gruver, Terry and Doherty had previously told me about Lieutenant Kally. It also convinced me that there was a very substantial amount of truth to the stories that all of these men had told. If I needed more convincing, I was about to receive it.
It was in the middle of November, 1968 just a few weeks before I was to return to the United States for separation from the army that I talked to Pfc Michael Bernhardt. Bernhardt had served his entire year in Viet Nam in "Charlie" Company 1/20 and he too was about to go home. "Bernie" substantiated the tales told by the other men I had talked to in vivid, bloody detail and added this. "Bernie" had absolutely refused to take part in the massacre of the villagers of "Pinkville" that morning and he thought that it was rather strange that the officers of the company had not made an issue of it. But that evening "Medina (Captain Ernest Medina) came up to me ("Bernie") and told me not to do anything stupid like write my congressman" about what had happened that day. Bernhardt assured Captain Medina that he had no such thing in mind. He had nine months left in Viet Nam and felt that it was dangerous enough just fighting the acknowledged enemy.
Exactly what did, in fact, occur in the village of "Pinkville" in March, 1968 I do not know for certain, but I am convinced that it was something very black indeed. I remain irrevocably persuaded that if you and I do truly believe in the principles, of justice and the equality of every man, however humble, before the law, that form the very backbone that this country is founded on, then we must press forward a widespread and public investigation of this matter with all our combined efforts. I think that it was Winston Churchill who, once said "A country without a conscience is a country without a soul, and a country without a soul is a country that cannot survive." I feel that I must take some positive action on this matter. I hope that you will launch an investigation immediately and keep me informed of your progress. If you cannot, then I don't know what other course of action to take.
I have considered sending this to newspapers, magazines and broadcasting companies, but I somehow feel that investigation and action by the Congress of the United States is the appropriate procedure, and as a conscientious citizen I have no desire to further besmirch the image of the American serviceman in the eyes of the world. I feel that this action, while probably it would promote attention, would not bring about the constructive actions that the direct actions of the Congre.ss of the United States would.
Sincerely,
/s/ Ron Ridenhour
Thanks John for this insightful memoir of your experience in training to become an army officer in the wake of the My Lai massacre. As someone who avoided the draft by 'the skin of my teeth', I always wanted to know what those brothers who were in uniform felt in learning the news. News of My Lai and what happened there was a turning point in how older Americans thought about the war. Younger people like me by that point were already involved in the protests against the war, but it took the news of My Lai and other atrocities to bring home to the broad public what crimes were being done in their name. I also appreciated the letter from Ron Ridenhour you shared. I had not known previously of the role he played in writing to the President and members of Congress. God bless whistle-blowers!
ReplyDeleteJohn, Thank you for writing this memoir. I was a senior in high school in Montrose, Colorado, when the town gave a hero's welcome home to Captain Ernest Medina. I wish I could say that I refused to participate in the parade in his honoour, as my father wished, but I was afraid of criticism by teachers and friends. But from that time forward, my entire family, participated fully in anti-war protests.
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