New Rules, Same Practice – UNDS Reform gone astray / Detlef Palm

by Detlef Palm

New Rules, Same Practice is the title of a report published by the Deutsche Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, or German Development Institute. The Institute is a government supported think tank purporting to influence the direction of foreign development policy and aid, including support to the United Nations. The study is presently being circulated in the UN Development system, presumably as proof that UN agencies have to more vigorously apply the current reform dogma. Here is the link to the study. 

In response, I wrote the following to the German Development Institute. We must engage those who are shaping the direction of the reform of the UN Development System.

Dear ...

We all agree that UN Development System needs reform, and very badly so. The UN has become bureaucratic and introvert, irrelevant, lost in process and jargon, and produces documents that nobody reads. I would have wished that the researchers would have questioned the overall direction of the reform, instead of serving to enforce a reform strategy that has been doomed for the last 20 years.

Old Assumptions

Since its inception, the reform pushed by the UN Development Coordination Office builds on the 20-year old assumption that the lack of coherence and coordination among UN agencies is one of the main reason for member states being slow in achieving development goals. This assumption was put forward by a consortium of Nordic donor countries, was relentlessly repeated until it was accepted as a universal truth, but has rarely been tested nor questioned.

The original “call for coherence” was directed towards donor countries, who often wished to finance programmes based on their own policies. For example, one donor wishes to promote a health system based on the NHS model of the UK, while others wish to promote an insurance-based system such as applied in Germany. The original “call for coherence” was not aimed at the UN, whose agencies pursued rather discrete areas of expertise. While the call for coherence was zealously pursued by the UNDCO, donor countries did very little to become coherent, even though they are providing considerably larger amounts of development aid.

Largely ignored in the UN reform agenda has been the widely differing performance records of UN development agencies. Underperforming agencies must shape up, instead of sitting in even more internal meetings talking to each other about their own affairs. All agencies need to shed much of their bureaucracy that the current reform drive has been imposing on the system.

It has been a persistent myth that UN staff do not coordinate with each other. Every professional knows with whom to interact, coordinate, or build alliances. In my experience, a UNICEF health officer will pick up the phone to her WHO colleague whenever there is the likelihood of overlap. In contrast, the introduction of results groups with vaguely articulated outcomes has drawn professionals away from concrete action and expertise. It also let to even more agencies joining those coordination group merely in the hope that some funding would get their way, making overlap more likely than reducing it.

The report asserts that pooled funding will reduce competition between agencies. The opposite is true. Pooled funding moves the allocation of funds ‘under the radar’ away from scrutiny of the donors. In my experience, pooled funding has led to a significantly greater scattering of resources based on dubious arguments of ‘fairness and equality’ and subjective interpretation of needs.

Governments were left of the hook

While Delivering as One (DAO) seems to be a horse no longer worth flogging, its introduction 15 years ago caused a major blow to the understanding of the UN Development System, from which it is unlikely to recover very soon. Before DAO, most people would have agreed that countries themselves are responsible for making investments and adopting policies for the benefit of its people, children, the economy, the poor, the environment, and so forth. The UN would provide expertise, and willing donors would help particularly poor countries to finance any new national policies and programmes. With its nomenclature, definition of accountabilities, and reporting requirements, DAO created a myth that the UN would be responsible for delivering results – results which could only be achieved by the host governments of the programme countries themselves. The governments, including less savoury ones, were left off the hook.

The development programme and policy environment has changed

Sixty or so years ago, underdevelopment was synonymous with lack of money and poor health. Funds and programme were created to bring in money and expertise. The underlying assumption was that one could make a logical and convincing argument for a country and its government to develop itself - reduce mortality, increase GDP, empower women, and so forth.

Knowledge has become ubiquitous. Most countries have doctors, pedagogues, social scientists, statisticians and managers that are as clever as we are. When a Northern water engineer is dying of thirst, the bushman can still squeeze water from somewhere. It is no longer about “us telling them” how to do things. Rather than focusing on capacity building, it will be more important to stimulate dialogue, locally and globally.

Nowadays, most agencies want to be a fund, have their share of the aid package, and larger budgets to finance themselves. A country’s internal politics have remained mostly taboo and are considered a distraction from the UN’s masterful plan; politicians are often thought to be swayed by dark forces.

Development is a political process, and Policy Change is the End-Game

Yet, national policy change is the end-game. If a development intervention is to be successful and sustainable, it requires a change of national policy and budgets. Capacity building measures or financial support are a consequence of national policy change, not a precursor or an alternative.

Development and government provision of services and entitlements are a matter of choice and hence the outcome of a political process. Development can only be dictated in autocratic regimes. In the rest of countries, priorities, investments, and solutions are subject to a public discourse. People have different interest and priorities which often compete with each other. One group favours investments in early childhood programmes for migrant children, another favours a decent university for their own kids. Someone wants big money for digitalization; someone else wants to protect against unemployment. Both sides have a cause, and both sides can produce evidence supporting their preference. Political decisions are the outcomes of negotiations and public debate.

Agencies of the Development System represent constituencies. UNICEF would argue for the best interests of the child, and UNEP might be the champion for the environment. WHO is the expert for pandemics and UN Women does well to push women’s rights. All these interests shape a society, and hence the direction of development in a country. Each UN agency should do its utmost to present the best available scientific knowledge, the globally agreed standards, and the best arguments for their constituencies. This will enrich and often rationalize the national debate, and lead to better development outcomes.

The ‘One Voice’ is counterproductive, as it pre-empts the public discourse and discussion among our counterparts and the public at large. Any serious government official would want to hear the best arguments from potentially competing sectors or specialists, rather than listening to a lukewarm compromise described in lengthy and inward looking UN papers.

The current reform of the UN Development System is going into the wrong direction.

Mit freundlichen Grüßen

*****

More Insights from Outside the Bubble

Detlef can be contacted via detlefpalm55@gmail.com .