Core Commitments : Nils Kastberg

by Nils Kastberg

One of the strengths of UNICEF not least during the Jim Grant era, was the significant delegation of authority and freedom of action given by the ED to the UNICEF representatives at country level. However, while this enabled a locally well anchored development effort, it created a very uneven response in emergency situations. Many representatives felt the “silent onset emergencies” resulting from lack of “development” investment in children, health, mothers, caused more deaths of children than in emergencies. This was an argument I met when joining UNICEF as Director of Emergency Programmes in April 1998. A related argument was that UNICEF should not run after high visibility emergencies, like many NGOs and other UN agencies did, but concentrate primarily on child focused development, even structural adjustment with a human – child – face, as many more children died from lack of development than children who died in emergencies.

A number of UNICEF staff, even representatives, however, took great initiatives in emergencies, but had to struggle with a system not tuned for rapid staff deployment, quick procurement procedures and speedy delivery of supplies. Additionally, some countries required UN agencies in general, UNICEF included, to seek governmental approval for their emergency operations, making early fund raising and early response difficult. At times, UNICEF deployed emergency staff who operated practically in parallel to the UNICEF Country Office, with the natural frictions this caused, and accusations on both sides undermining determined and cohesive action. Another generic characteristic from this period was the sense among staff that UNICEF was unique – and much better – than the rest of the UN system. The reality for children in emergency settings, whether refugee or internally displaced, showed a sporadic, unpredictable, at times absent UNICEF. We had become fantastic communicators but underwhelming in our response on the ground.

The Martigny meeting in 1998 brought together the top leadership of UNICEF at the time, with the representatives of some 50 countries affected by emergencies. Background provided the reports of many UNICEF representatives who in previous decades were engaged in emergencies and suffered from the weaknesses both from the UNICEF lack of systems for rapid response, as well as from “ideological” perspectives on the UNICEF role in emergency situations. The participants contributed in a substantial way to define the many areas of improvements needed to respond to the three questions the meeting was convened to respond: What are the core corporate responsibilities of UNICEF toward children in emergencies; how could UNICEF become a trustworthy partner for the international community to respond in a predictable manner to the needs of children; and what changes where needed in UNICEF to fulfill those ambitions.

Logistical improvements at all levels were initiated, and agreements on core commitments to children in emergencies worldwide, which would engage the entire organization, were developed. A twenty four hour emergency operations centre was established to support staff in the frontlines of emergency operations. A humanitarian and human rights unit was established to ensure these principles guided us in complex humanitarian situations which involved military operations. Learning to respond to emergencies and to operate by consent – rather than at the request – of States was initiated by representatives, such as Alan Court in India, in line with the General Assembly resolution 46/182. Seeking to connect better development measures with emergency operations led to the lives of millions of children saved. This was particularly evident when UNICEF – against the wishes of donors – initiated in 1999 the mass vaccination campaigns against measles in “emergency” countries (to complement the initiatives done to eradicate polio). Donors considered measles vaccination a development measure and would not fund these campaigns from humanitarian funds; and the representatives of donors managing development funds claiming funds for measles vaccinations could not be used in emergency situations. By 2008, nine years later, the overall measles rate in Africa had been reduced by eighty five percent.

A crucial and interesting support received from DFID Humanitarian Department, then led by the charismatic Mukesh Kapila, was a three year “capacity building” support from them to strengthen UNICEF capacity to respond in a predictable manner. Only three overall indicators were required by DFID for the fifteen million US Dollar investment, which was used for measures and staff at global and regional levels, and certain specific countries. UNICEF was to have made significant progress in three years in generating worldwide aversion against the use of child soldiers, in getting 150 countries to sign the Ottawa Convention banning the use of land mines, and responding to emergency situations on an inter-agency basis in a more predictable manner. These three goals were largely achieved, and it is a separate story, worthy of recording.

We can thus certainly point at significant progress having been made in the past 25 years in enhancing the UNICEF response to emergencies. However, challenges remain, both internal to UNICEF, as well as in the inter-agency arena. That should be the subject of a next article, but having been involved in so much of the past decades of humanitarian response, I feel it is important to give credit to how a very significant number of staff of UNICEF engaged in making our organization more predictable in its response to protection and assistance needs of children.

However, the enormous increase of support staff functions in the past years, has contributed to put too many restrictions on the frontline staff. With few exceptions, UNICEF support staff get away with total impunity for how they create impediments to humanitarian response. The Operation Lifeline Sudan of the 1990s and 2000s would be impossible today with the strictures imposed by the UNICEF admin and support staff on field staff. If we are to make progress in the UNICEF response to large scale complex emergencies in the coming twenty five years, then support staff must be held accountable for the measures they introduce which hamper humanitarian response. The past twenty five years prove change can be made, and millions of lives of children can be saved in the coming decades, if we learn from the past.

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