I arrived in Baghdad on the 29th of September 1997. I was briefed by the Representative, Philip Heffinck and the OIC in Erbil, Richard Prado. After four days, I was happy to join UNICEF Erbil. Following the first Gulf War, the office had been established in 1991 by Stewart McNab, who was my first supervisor in UNICEF Nepal.
My first shock came enroute to Erbil, when the driver filled the tank of the Landcruiser. I was confused with what I saw. The driver paid the equivalent to 65 cents. Despite his ruthlessness, one of Saddam’s contributions to the public was to make fuel almost free. The story in the office went that drivers didn’t bother filling claims for reimbursement for fuel as it was not worth the paperwork!
On to Kurdistan …
After several hours of driving, we arrived at ‘no man’s land’ in Kirkuk, where the autonomous region of Kurdistan begins. I had to switch vehicles at the border crossing. Two Czech UN guards, more than two meters tall, welcomed me. It was intimidating.
I was not quite confident that I would handle the challenges ahead. I had been managing a $1.2m budget with eleven staff in the Maldives. Now I was heading to an office with a budget of hundreds of millions of Dollars with more than 100 staff members and two sub offices. At the time, it was the largest programme managed by UNICEF in any country. Urban Jonsson had recommended me for the job (as I learned much later) and I was grateful to Carol Bellamy for trusting and convincing me that I could handle it.
Kurdistan was governed by two Kurdish factions, who were at each other’s throat: the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) controlled Erbil and Dohuk and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controlled Sulaymaniyah. I never had any formal training on conflict negotiations or conflict management and there I was in the middle of a most complicated political and ethnic conflict. Every activity and input had to be identical in Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah, irrespective of the need. It was a highly politicised project full of controversies and suspicions, and a real life exercise in ‘learning by doing’!
Kurdistan had its own currency called Swiss Dinar; it was the currency used in Iraq prior to the Gulf War. After the war, Iraq had new currency for the rest of Iraq.
My first shock came enroute to Erbil, when the driver filled the tank of the Landcruiser. I was confused with what I saw. The driver paid the equivalent to 65 cents. Despite his ruthlessness, one of Saddam’s contributions to the public was to make fuel almost free. The story in the office went that drivers didn’t bother filling claims for reimbursement for fuel as it was not worth the paperwork!
On to Kurdistan …
After several hours of driving, we arrived at ‘no man’s land’ in Kirkuk, where the autonomous region of Kurdistan begins. I had to switch vehicles at the border crossing. Two Czech UN guards, more than two meters tall, welcomed me. It was intimidating.
I was not quite confident that I would handle the challenges ahead. I had been managing a $1.2m budget with eleven staff in the Maldives. Now I was heading to an office with a budget of hundreds of millions of Dollars with more than 100 staff members and two sub offices. At the time, it was the largest programme managed by UNICEF in any country. Urban Jonsson had recommended me for the job (as I learned much later) and I was grateful to Carol Bellamy for trusting and convincing me that I could handle it.
Kurdistan was governed by two Kurdish factions, who were at each other’s throat: the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) controlled Erbil and Dohuk and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) controlled Sulaymaniyah. I never had any formal training on conflict negotiations or conflict management and there I was in the middle of a most complicated political and ethnic conflict. Every activity and input had to be identical in Erbil, Dohuk and Sulaymaniyah, irrespective of the need. It was a highly politicised project full of controversies and suspicions, and a real life exercise in ‘learning by doing’!
Kurdistan had its own currency called Swiss Dinar; it was the currency used in Iraq prior to the Gulf War. After the war, Iraq had new currency for the rest of Iraq.
Northern Iraq was under a no-fly zone. Every now and then, the UN Security department would advise us by telex of any restrictions for travel on certain dates to certain areas. Allied forces would fly for their targets practice, which could be any standing structures including electric power distribution poles or shepherd’s den. UNICEF fieldwork continued as and when feasible. It was a crime to say the least.
The oil-for-food mystery
To address the humanitarian crisis, the UN Security Council passed resolution UNSCR-961 in 1995 which allowed Iraq to sell oil to generate a fixed amount of $ every six months. The programme started in December 1996 and concluded in November 2003. The programme went through 13 six-month phases, and Iraq sold $64.6 billion worth of oil.
During the time, the price of oil fluctuated from $16.7 per barrel to $ 26.0 per barrel. Hence, the amount of oil Iraq could export varied in different phases. This was another hassle, as someone had to monitor that Iraq would not exceed its income beyond the amount set by the UN Sanctions Committee. The oil revenue was deposited into an ‘Iraq oil account’ at Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP), to which the Iraqi government had no access.
Thirty per cent of the revenue was set aside for the UN compensation fund, to be paid to relevant countries and companies as compensation, including reparation to Kuwait. About 2.6 million claims for $348 billion were made by foreign workers in Kuwait and Iraq, corporations, government enterprises, and governments (including from UN Security Council members) for damages and losses.
The expenses of all Iraq related meetings of UN personnel and government officials were paid out of Iraqi oil revenue. Compensation payments continued beyond the life of the ‘oil-for-food’ programme. One claim related to the costs of a study of migratory birds in the Gulf region following the Gulf war, proposed by a UN Security Council member state on behalf of the Council for International Bird Preservation. No doubt an important study from the biodiversity perspective. Meanwhile, Iraqi people were on the verge of starvation.
After deducting the costs of administration of the ‘oil-for-food’ programme, 13 per cent of the revenue was left for programmes in Iraqi Kurdistan and 53 per cent for Iraq under the Baghdad government. UNICEF Erbil received its share out of this 13 per cent for education, health, nutrition, water and sanitation, and child protection programmes.
There was no bank in Kurdistan. Hundreds of millions of $ worth of UN projects operated on a cash-on-hand basis, brought in from Cyprus or Kuwait on UN flights. From Baghdad, cash was ferried by car every fortnight or monthly to Northern Iraq. All salaries and payments were paid in $. Iraq and Kurdistan were very safe. Loaded with cash $, our vehicles were never attacked during transit, and our office never looted despite nearly every adult in Northern Iraq owning a weapon.
Obstructions
Nobody ever knew whether a six-month phase would be renewed; everyone was hoping for sanctions to be lifted. The six-months planning horizon created a sense of uncertainty and insecurity among staff. The Sanctions Committee would reject longer plans.
The UN was not allowed to spend a dollar in Iraq although the money came from Iraq itself. Training of the civil service was proscribed, as it was considered strengthening the capacity of the regime. This restriction did not apply for Kurdistan as the West was friendly to the Kurds. Notwithstanding, even some UNICEF staff in Kurdistan insisted on not spending any money locally.
The Erbil office would prepare supply and distribution lists in consultation with KDP and PUK; they had to be approved by the Iraqi government in Baghdad. No questions were ever asked by the Baghdad Government on UNICEF submissions for Kurdistan. The Government would submit all lists to the Office of Iraqi Programme (OIP) in New York, copied to the UN Security Council. The staffing of the OIP included many who were hostile to the Iraqi government, making approvals all the more difficult. This submission, every six months, had to be approved by the Secretary General himself, no joke.
Aside from the delays by the OIP, it also splits supply lists and items arrive in Iraq at different times. Lloyd’s agents at the border make sure that nothing gets in or out without the approval of OIP. If, because of split shipments, the goods do not match the original supply lists, entry would be refused. Additional approvals had to be requested; a nightmare repeated virtually on all supply lists. No matter that syringes cannot be used without needles, and the procedures made the UN and the Iraqi government look bad in the eyes of the Iraqi public, for not being able to deliver essential supplies on time. The international news blamed the government of Iraq for the failure, and the news reporters described the situation as if they were actually present and eye-witnessing in the field.
The Sanctions Committee had employed hundreds of ‘Observers’ with unfettered access to field locations; they would physically count exercise books and pencils in primary schools and compare it with the distribution list. They would visit a health center and count paracetamol pills. They never shared their reports with UNICEF or sought clarification for a local mismatch. They sent their reports directly to the Sanctions Committee, where it would make international headlines denouncing corruption.
The office was to submit weekly progress reports to OIP. What progress happens from one week to the next in a country under sanctions and restriction in movement? You had to be a storyteller to write a weekly report. I am still unsure if anyone read them. Eventually, the Almighty intervened and the OIP, and the requirement became a monthly report. It still was too much paperwork for no reason. To me, the question remains how the entire UN could surrender its authority to the Sanctions Committee.
Lighter moments
Once the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs of KDP invited a few heads of UN agencies for dinner. Almost at midnight and having emptied several bottles of hard liquor, the Minister came with a tray and announced here are some ‘pizzas’! One head of agency said ‘Minister, if this is pizza, I can be the Pope’! You have to say it out loud with an Italian accent!
In 1999, I accompanied Carol Bellamy for a courtesy calls on Kurdish leaders. She first met with Mr. Masoud Barzani, who was Prime Minister of KPD controlled governorates, and is now the President of Iraqi Kurdistan. Mr. Barzani was a very polite introvert and the meeting was plain and very courteous. The next day we went to Sulaymaniyah to meet Mr. Jalal Talabani who was the Prime Minister of PUK controlled governorate, and President of Iraq from 2005 to 2014. He was very vivacious and chatty. After formal introductions, Mr. Talabani started to tell his stories of his time in Washington, his political contacts, names of Senators, and so on. After a few minutes Carol Bellamy said ‘Mr. Prime Minister, I am visiting Iraq as Executive Director of UNICEF. I have nothing to do with the people you have mentioned or the government of the United States’! The meeting continued with no further sparks.
Once a Kurdish gentleman came to my office asking for help. He used to live in Turkey and got married there. He now wanted to return to Kurdistan but Turkish authorities would not allow his wife to leave. I explained that this is beyond my jurisdiction of work. He said he thought UNICEF can help all children and women!
Scary moments
When the US started Desert Fox and bombing Iraq in December 1998, all international staff from Kurdistan were evacuated. Turkish and Syrian borders were closed; staff had to make an arduous journey to Amman via Baghdad. We were just three Internationals left in Erbil, and our biggest worry was what if we were attacked as there was a huge amount of cash in the office.
In October 2000, I was leaving the country most disliked by donors for Ghana, the country they most loved. I received a note from the UN, telling me that I need not worry but if I wanted to I could take a radiation test! I could not believe my eyes. It meant that the UN was aware of the use by the allied armies of missiles coated with depleted uranium. Erbil is close to Kirkuk and Mosul, which were two targets for regular bombings, besides Baghdad. Fortunately, 22 years later I am still here … recollecting these fond memories.
Remembering Kurdistan
The Kurdish population, estimated at between 30 to 40 million, is possibly the largest minority without their own country. Kurdish people live as a minority population in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Only Iraq gave autonomous status to Kurdish people living in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1970.
Reminiscences of my three years in Kurdistan remain engraved in my head forever. Despite my initial apprehension and seemingly insurmountable difficulties, those were some of my best professional days! It was great to work with Kurdish professionals. I learned many practical lessons about programme management and dealing with people, none of which could have been learned in university classrooms.
The oil-for-food programme was as unique a programme as the UN has ever managed, full of controversies, highly politicised and programmed to fail. Civilians had to bear the consequences of Saddam's brutalities and the harsh treatment imposed by the UN Sanctions Committee.
During the three years I saw resignations in protest by two outstanding internationalists, Mr. Denis Halliday and Mr. Hans von Sponeck who were Humanitarian Coordinators for Iraq. The UN allocated $ 35 Million to investigate the allegations of corruption in the ‘oil-for-food’ programme. To spend such an amount of Iraqi money for an investigation is possibly a larger misuse than the alleged corruption in the actual implementation of the ‘oil-for-food’ programme. The Volker commission did not find any wrongdoings in its implementation.
I wish I were a real story teller instead of being an introvert manager!
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