A Little History - Biafra, UNICEF and the SG : Tom McDermott

The Nobel

In UNICEF we are justly proud of the Nobel Prize awarded in 1965.  Less known is the fact that UNICEF was the runner-up candidate, who nonetheless won in the end.   So, who did not win the Prize that year, or for the next two years?

In early 1965 the Norwegian permanent representative to the UN informed Secretary General, U Thant, that he would be awarded the Nobel Prize that year in recognition of the role he had played during the Cuban missile crisis and the settlement of the Katanga secession from the Congo.

Alas, it was not to be. Every member of the Nobel Committee, save one, had voted for U Thant to receive the award. The one who did not approve was the one with a veto power, the Chairman, Gunnar Jahn, who argued that the SG had simply been doing his job. No doubt, there were likely other reasons for Jahn's decision, but they have never become clear.   The dispute within the Committee over Jahn’s veto was so bitter that the Nobel was not awarded in the following two years, 1966 and 1967. Ralph Bunch, U Thant’s USG and himself later a Nobel laureate called Jahn’s decision, “a gross injustice to U Thant.”

Gunnar Jahn, Chairman of the Nobel Committee

Instead of U Thant, the 1965 Nobel went to UNICEF. Outwardly humble, the SG said that the news of the Nobel going to UNICEF instead of him, “gave him pleasure”. Inwardly, perhaps the slight left some scars which would reappear in later years.

The slight the SG may have felt with UNICEF in 1965 was not the key factor when the Biafra crisis arrived in 1967. But it may well have been a factor as the comparison between UNICEF’s work in Biafra and the inaction by the UN and its other agencies became more and more obvious to the public by 1969.

Becoming SG amidst multiple world crises

It was Hammarskjold’s tragic death that led to U Thant’s appointment, first as Acting SG in November 1961 and then as the SG from 1963. Even as only the ‘Acting’ SG, his forceful actions in the Congo, and his diplomatic efforts during the Cuban crisis were largely responsible for his extension and appointment  as SG in 1963 and again in 1966. 

In the eyes of U Thant, the secession of Biafra in 1967 needed to be viewed in the context of the earlier attempt by Katanga to break away from the Congo.  It was natural perhaps for the SG to take this view.  After all, U Thant was chairman of the UN Commission on the Congo Crisis in 1961 when his predecessor, Dag Hammarskjold was killed during negotiations with the leader of the breakaway province, Moise Tshombe.

Congo and Katanga, Nigeria and Biafra - Same or Different?

Like Nigeria, the Congo achieved independence in 1960. The country quickly descended into chaos, prompting the former colonial power, Belgium, to invade on the pretext of re-establishing order and protecting its nationals.

Katanga had declared its independence from the Congo in 1960 with strong support from the former colonial power, Belgium, and more importantly with support from mining companies anxious to control its resources. The Congolese Government appealed for UN assistance, resulting in the UN’s first peace-keeping mission, ONUC. The UN force eventually grew to 20,000 troops and became an active military force, not simply a peace-keeper. In December 1962 Katanga forces attacked elements of the UN force. U Thant ordered an armed response, titled Operation Grand Slam, which ended the secession of Katanga and forced its reintegration with the Congo in January 1963.

Despite also being a breakaway effort, the Biafran revolt in Nigeria was quite different from that of Katanga in the Congo. There was no support by the former colonial power and no strong commercial interest supporting Biafra. In fact, Biafra was in many ways the opposite situation with the colonial power, Britain, arming Nigeria largely in order to protect British oil interests.

There was another difference too.  Unlike Katanga, Biafra had been formally recognized by five other, mostly African countries (Haiti was the only non-African state). This international recognition made the Biafra issue more an international dispute deserving the attention of the UN and the OAU.

Still, it is no great surprise that U Thant took a similar approach to that taken by the UN in the Congo. He saw both simply as civil wars in which the UN should defend the sovereign state in shutting down any secession by a region. Shortly after the Biafran war ended he declared in a press conference:

“As far as the question of secession of a particular section of a Member State is concerned, the United Nations’ attitude is unequivocal. As an international organization, the United Nations has never accepted and does not accept, and I do not believe it will ever accept the principle of secession of a part of its Member States.”

In his memoirs he wrote: 

“Although I was deeply concerned by the incredible human suffering and starvation in Biafra, there was never any doubt in my mind that the conflict was strictly an internal matter and, therefore, outside the jurisdiction of the United Nations.”

In June 1968 U Thant held discussions with Nigeria’s permanent representative, Ambassador Ogdu, and reconfirmed the UN’s position that Biafra was an internal affair for Nigeria to sort out.

1968 - The International Year of Human Rights?

There is great irony in the fact that the United Nations had declared 1968 the International Year of Human Rights. In fact, 1968 was the first of two years of mass starvation in Biafra and surrounding areas of Nigeria.  

Surveys by pediatricians showed severe malnutrition was common among children as early as March 1967.  By January 1969 when a 4 person study mission headed by US Senator Charles Goodell and sponsored by UNICEF visited, the the senior nutritionist, Dr. Jean Mayer, of Harvard and Dr. Roy Brown of Tufts estimated that at least 10,000 children were dying each day due to malnutrition and malnutrition related diseases.   

The author and then UNICEF consultant, Dan Jacobs, tells of one early Hq. meeting when he naively asked why UNICEF was worrying about getting tons of food into the area, instead of demanding the UN mount a full relief force.  He recalls, "There was a moment of silence. Then Sasha Bacic said somberly, “A million of those people will die - that’s all.” 

In the end likely two million died, most of them children.  So much for the year of International Human Rights!

ICRC Becomes the Coordinator

Facing growing demands for a relief effort, the British government advised the military government in Nigeria (the FMG)  to insist that all relief supplies should be managed by the ICRC. They gave this advice knowing full well that, while ICRC had extensive experience in overseeing the situation of prisoners of war, it had no experience or capacity for mounting major relief operations. 

 Within ICRC itself, there was a degree of apathy.  As Dick Heyward later described it, there was a “great difference of atmosphere and priorities - a feeling of ‘what was the urgency? ’”. He went on to describe meeting one of the senior officials who turned up at his office late for a 10 a.m. meeting and wearing white gloves.  The official explained that he was late for the meeting, because he had just come in from tending his rose garden.

Under growing international criticism, the FMG said they would permit ICRC to use a land corridor for food and relief supplies, but would not agree to deliveries by sea or air.  Moreover,  they insisted on  inspecting all cargoes. The problem with this line was that the land corridor proposed by Nigeria was the main road along which its invasion force was massed. Repairing bridges to let in the relief trucks meant also opening the way for the military force. Moreover, Biafra had discovered that large quantities of black market salt making its way in from Nigeria were laced with arsenic. They feared that ‘inspections’ would result in further attempts to poison the population. Instead, the Biafrans wanted deliveries by sea or air, and inspections by neutral international observers.

In late July the NY Times reported on remarks by the SG following a meeting with the Nigerian Ambassador. The headline reads , “Thant Bids Biafra Yield on Relief” - in short, placing the blame for the impasse completely on Biafra.  Press reports from the area made it clear that aid was ready and had been pre-positioned by UNICEF and ICRC, but that it was the FMG that was blocking their movement, not the Biafrans.

UNICEF already has its ‘permission’

Around this time U Thant went to Geneva where he met with ICRC.  A meeting followed with the chiefs of UNICEF, WHO, FAO and WFP. The SG insisted strongly that no aid should go into Biafra without written approval of the FMG and only through ICRC. As the meeting ended, Henry Labouisse said briefly that he understood, but that in UNICEF’s case he already had that agreement, and that this was sufficient so far as he was concerned.  In saying so, he no doubt irritated U Thant and other agency chiefs, but managed to suggest that UNICEF was already complying with the SG's wishes.  In doing so, Labouisse was referring to the agreement Sasha Bacic had obtained the previous December.  The FMG later announced that the agreement was no longer valid (fortunately, by then a full airlift was well underway).

In late 1968 and throughout 1969 public opinion became increasingly aware of the stark comparison between the performance of church groups and UNICEF on the one hand, and on the other hand the complete absence of action by the rest of the UN.  Heyward later said, “..U Thant got offended with UNICEF. I think mischief makers reported to him alleged statements we had made about his lack of action or ineffective action in the field… that he had made wrong decisions. This added to the problems.”

The interviewer asked whether the other agencies understood that in this situation it was principally children who were starving and therefore UNICEF had a special mission. Heyward replied, " WHO and FAO should not be turning their backs on starving children either."  He continued, “I’m sure it was guilt...they had decided not to do anything and were somewhat embarrassed that UNICEF was going ahead….they thought that UNICEF was out of line and not acting as a member of the UN family….U Thant also was not very happy about it. “

Labouisse as the SG's special envoy?

Even if the SG was irritated, he still relied at times on Henry Labouisse.  Instead of visiting Nigeria or Biafra himself, he decided to send a special envoy to Lagos (and not to Biafra).  He then asked Labouisse to represent him during a visit to Lagos. According to Heyward, “Mr. Labouisse declined, saying that he thought it was better for UNICEF to act in its traditional way, rather than falling into this UN pattern.”  Labouisse, of course, did go to Lagos, spending a full month there during the war and again after the war had ended.  He made clear, however, that he was not representing the SG, but rather was there on a 'non-political' visit in line with UNICEF's mandate for children. 

U Thant, himself, waited until after Biafra had fallen in January 1970 to visit Nigeria and then only for meetings in Lagos.  He made no effort to visit the affected area or talk to civilians and aid workers. 

Following the SG's visit, the NY Times published a scathing article by Anthony Lewis, “If Wishing Would Make It So”. Reading the article won’t make you feel any better about the UN under U Thant, but it is worth reading nonetheless. Click here.

Farewell and Hello

U Thant finished his final term of office the following year in September 1971. In his farewell address, U Thant spoke of a great sense of relief bordering on liberation from the burdens of the office. After two weeks of delays, the members of the Security Council vetoed every candidate in a first and second round of voting. Finally in the third round, there was a mix-up in coordination among permanent members and the US, UK and China ended up abstaining, leaving Kurt Waldheim as the UN's new  ‘accidental’ SG.


Read more articles in our UNICEF history series.