Editor's Note: This is a transcript of a situation report sent by Paul Ignatieff on 19 May 1975
SITUATION "REPORT: THE LAST DAYS
BACKGROUNDAs the hostilities closed in on Phnom Penh, UNICEF developed a contingency plan for continuing assistance to children as covered in Memo PEN/NY/154 and approved by HQ cable 160. Under this plan priorities were continued, and emergency airlift started to stockpile high protein foods and medical supplies, and operational assistance was provided to non-governmental organizations operating children's health and nutrition programmes. The Khmer Operational Unit was also established in Bangkok as international staff was thinned out.
As the hostilities closed in on Phnom Penh, UNICEF developed a contingency plan for continuing assistance to children as covered in Memo PEN/NY/154 and approved by HQ cable 160. Under this plan priorities were continued, and emergency airlift started to stockpile high protein foods and medical supplies, and operational assistance was provided to non-governmental organizations operating children's health and nutrition programmes. The Khmer Operational Unit was also established in Bangkok as international staff was thinned out.
There were clear reasons for continuing UNICEF staff presence in Phnom Penh. Foremost was the desire to continue assistance to children during the increasingly difficult siege and then, during the transition period which was expected to follow. We also wished to be in a position to make immediate contact with the new authorities in order to provide large-scale relief and rehabilitation programmas immediately.
An important factor were the assurances received from the GRUNK Embassy in Hanoi which had already accepted UNICEF assistance. The first message relayed through the the UNICEF Representative in Hanoi in February stated:
As the hostilities closed in on Phnom Penh, UNICEF developed a contingency plan for continuing assistance to children as covered in Memo PEN/NY/154 and approved by HQ cable 160. Under this plan priorities were continued, and emergency airlift started to stockpile high protein foods and medical supplies, and operational assistance was provided to non-governmental organizations operating children's health and nutrition programmes. The Khmer Operational Unit was also established in Bangkok as international staff was thinned out.
There were clear reasons for continuing UNICEF staff presence in Phnom Penh. Foremost was the desire to continue assistance to children during the increasingly difficult siege and then, during the transition period which was expected to follow. We also wished to be in a position to make immediate contact with the new authorities in order to provide large-scale relief and rehabilitation programmas immediately.
An important factor were the assurances received from the GRUNK Embassy in Hanoi which had already accepted UNICEF assistance. The first message relayed through the the UNICEF Representative in Hanoi in February stated:
"Tell Mr.Ignatieff we are looking forward to seeing him in Phnom Penh in the near future."
The second message relayed in Cable 55 stated:
"Following message for you from Beaumont dated 9 April: "Both messages received. Ignatieff and Acar carefully acknowledged. More tomorrow about their use. Noted continued programme with interest but I cannot get a definite answer on the stockpile inside. Therefore suggest increasing the stockpile outside. Awaiting confirmation of Vice Prime Minister Khieu Samphan and Special Ambassador Chao Seng.."
However, despite this careful assessment and preparation events subsequently developed in a completely unpredictable manner as the country remained under military control and no civilian authorities were available prior to all foreigners and all agencies being asked to leave.
OPERATIONS
After successfully completing their assignments related to the airlift and the emergency distribution of milk and medical supplies, Ms. Strassburger and Mr. Kristofferson left Phnom Penh on 7 April, leaving Mr. Ignatieff and Mr. Acar. From then until 16 April the Phnom Penh office was preoccupied with operating the Emergency Medical stockpile and arranging distribution of high protein foods.
On 12 April the United States Embassy evacuated, after which the US-Supported non-governmental organizations continued operations for two days with their Khmer national staff. Subsequently, only the International Red Cross, the British Save the Children Fund, Terre des Hommes were able to function until the city fell.
On 15 April UNICEF distributed medical supplies and intravenous solutions to treat casualties in the four Phnom Penh dispensaries which had been recently repaired and continued to operate with the Khmer Government staff. Mr. Acar distributed rice, dried fish, canned pork and nuoc mam to our national staff and they were instructed to remain home until contacted by the Representative. By noon, shell fire and rockets were falling near the office and it was decided to evacuate to Hotel Phnom that afternoon.
On 16 April, the Representative, with Dr. Caballe of WHO, arranged an emergency distribution of drugs and intravenous solutions to the AKS Hospital paediatric ward and rehydration centre. Our Khmer warehouse staff were all present and fully operational.
During the afternoon the status of the Red Cross International Security Zone was finally settled, and UNICEF and other UN staff assisted in its operation. However, as the status of the zone was still in question, the UNICEF staff decided to stay at the French Embassy, where at midnight they were graciously accommodated in the Ambassador's residence.
On the morning of 17 April, the Representative made a tour of the city at 6:00 a.m. and found FANK soldiers mixing with the refugees pouring into the city -- a clear indication that the army was giving in. By 9:00 a.m. the surrender had taken place in front of the Lycee Des Cartes, and the city populace poured into the streets to celebrate.
Also during the morning Mr. Pan Sothi, Mr. Kong Orn and two other Ministers, together with Prince Sirik Matak requested refuge in the security zone. The Red Cross had to refuse, as they had no legal basis to provide asylum, and the presence of those persons would have jeopardized the safety of all in the zone. The Representative drove Mr. Pan Sothi and Mr. Kong Orn and the two other Ministers to the RDF office and Prince Sirik Matak subsequently received asylum in the French Embassy.
By midday the Khmer Rouge had started a systematic evacuation of the city. At 3:30 p.m. soldiers arrived at the Hotel Le Phnom and demanded the immediate evacuation of all Khmer citizens. At 4:15 p.m. all the foreigners went to the French Embassy.
At this point I wish to stress that UNICEF operations during the last days would have been impossible without the dedication and intelligent assistance of M. Acar.
INTERNMENT
The French Embassy compound was divided into three groups. There were approximately 70 French officials and "counsels' ' in the Chancellery, over 500 French citizens scattered throughout the park and the international group centred in the Ambassador's residence. The International group was composed of 116 Persons of 21 nationalities, including United Nations, Red Cross and foreign press personnel. There were also approximately 150 Pakistani nationals associated with this group. The Representative was given the task of coordinating this volatile group including responsibility for food, water, and legal status. He was assisted by H. Scheller of UNDP, MI. Pasquier of Red Cross and Major Leopard of the British Save the Children Fund.
Originally there were over 1200 persons in the compound, until the Khmer Rouge demanded that all other nationals leave, including husbands of non-Khmer nationals. Throughout the period the electricity functioned, and drinking water was obtained by catching condensation from the air conditioners and this prevented any dysentry occurring in the international group. A supply of rice was found in the residence, and everybody pooled their tinned goods in order to provide stocks for communal meals, prepared by a Red Cross team and an American, Mr. Doug Sapper. Unfortunately, this communal approach was not adopted in the French group, who were much left on their own without any co-ordination or help from their officials, who lived in relative comfort in the Chancellery.
On 20 April the water supply was cut off due to malfunctioning in the city system, and the first delivery of water by the Khmer Rouge was made on 22 April. Although quantities were available for drinking, it was severely rationed with great discomfort to all. Two days later, the Khmer Rouge also started to deliver supplies of rice, pigs, and cigarettes. Incidentally, the first pig was butchered by a team composed of the Red Cross Surgeon and a Corsican mechanic!
On 24 April two Boeing 707s with Chinese markings arrived, presumably bringing in civilian government and administrative authorities. However, all contact continued with military authorities.
That same day the status of the Embassy was changed to an "International Regroupment Zone". Two days later on 26 April the Khmer Rouge forbade all radio transmissions. On 28 April the Khmer Rouge arrived and removed Prince Sirik Natak, the Minister of Health, the President of the National Assembly and Prince Sihanouk's former wife and her child. That evening they also entered the Embassy and cut the radio cables, thus stopping all reception of outside information. On 29 April we were informed we would be leaving the Embassy by truck convoy at 5 a.m. on the morning of 30 April.
Under these incredible circumstances, I should note the great humanity of Mr. Dyrac, the French Consul. Many lives were saved due to his compassionate application of legal statutes, often on papers vouched for by the UNDP and UNICEF Representatives.
CONVOY
The convoy was organized by the French Embassy. The Representative was placed in Truck no. 1, and Mr. Acar in Truck no. 2. Subsequently, the Representative learned that Mx. Acar's truck had been overcrowded and that he had volunteered to remain behind, and was evacuated in the second convoy.
Although preparations were made for a 3 a.m. departure, the convoy actually left Phnom Penh three hours late on 30 April. It took two days to drive from Phnom Penh to Kompong Chhnang (80 km) by the tortuous trails previously used by the Khmer Rouge as supply routes. The trucks were uncovered, 2 1/2 ton U.S. army trucks, the occupants were broiled by the sun during the day, and then at precisely 5 p.m. each evening soaked by the rain. One meal per day was provided by the Khmer Rouge. The first evening we slept in a pagoda on damp rice sacks, and the second evening in the Governor's house at Kompong Chhnang, in front of the toilet door -- not the best place!
On the third morning we reached Pursat at 10 a.m. and changed into ordinary covered trucks, and then proceeded to drive for 25 hours to Poiphot.
Incidentally, one child who was previously ill died during the trip.
It is interesting to speculate as to why the Khmer Rouge insisted on using trucks to expel the foreigners from Phnom Penh:
(a) to demonstrate that they were in control of the entire country, and could now go by road from Phnom Penh to Poipet, which was not possible during the previous regime.(b) to use their own means rather than depending on any outside assistance for this operation.(c) as stated by one of their officials, to "punish" foreigners for remaining in Phnom Penh after Vice Prime Minister Khieu Samphan's February warning that foreigners should leave the country.
CONTACTS WITH THE KHMER ROUGE
The first contact with the Khmer Rouge on 17 April was with a journalist who arrived at the International Security Zone and met with representatives of the International Red Cross, UNDP and UNICEF. While he seemed to be only interested in journalists, cards were presented, and each of the Representatives gave a description of the work of their agency and expressed a desire to meet with appropriate authorities.
The second contact was a formal meeting with the Comité de Ville, which took place that evening with the French Consul and Representatives of UNDP and UNICEF. The meeting was held to establish the security of the French Embassy, i.e. to prevent unauthorized entrance by soldiers or civilians.
The third meeting took place at the French Embassy on 18 April, again with members of the Comité de Ville, who remained anonymous. Present were the French Consul, the UNDP and UNICEF Representatives, and other members of the French Embassy. During the meeting the authorities were informed of who were in the Embassy and the UNICEF Representative expressed his desire to establish contact with appropriate authorities, so as to re-establish UNICEF collaboration in providing assistance for children. He also noted the considerable stock of material in our Phnom Penh warehouse, and larger quantities awaiting delivery in Singapore.
There were no replies to these verbal overtures. Subsequently the French authorities insisted on conducting all meetings with the Khmer Rouge themselves.
Finally, after considerable discussion, the French authorities agreed to transmit a Note Verbale 26 April, copy attached. Two days later the Note Verbale returned to the Representative unopened. That day the Representative again transmitted the Note Verbale with a covering letter addressed to the Vice-President of the Military Command of Phnom Penh, requesting him to relay it to the appropriate authorities. No answer was received.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
It is clear that the Cambodian civil war was immediately followed by a well-planned and total revolution. There was a systematic evacuation of most cities, towns and villages. Thus, virtually the entire population is now living at large in the countryside.
In Phnom Penh one saw wives pushing their husbands in hospital beds down the streets as hospitals were evacuated. In the French Calmette Hospital a number of operations were interrupted and its staff put under armed supervision. By the end of two days the city was quiet, as virtually the entire population had left. The same pattern was evident in Kompong Chhnang, Purgat, Battan bang, Sisophon and Poipot and the intervening villages. The only exceptions were those previously occupied "liberated" villages, whose inhabitants had been recontioned by the Khmer Rouge.
Reports from persons brought in by the Khmer Rouge from the countryside indicated that there were no controls placed on people leaving Phnom Penh, and they were allowed to drive their cars or push their belongings to "centres de triage", situated approximately 14-18 kilometres from the city centre. At this point, men, women and children were separated, only the very young children being left with their mothers. They were then sent into the countryside.
Meantime a systematic looting of all commercial establishments and large houses was carried out by the Khmer Rouge soldiers as part of a preconceived policy, probably for the following reasons:
Finally, after considerable discussion, the French authorities agreed to transmit a Note Verbale 26 April, copy attached. Two days later the Note Verbale returned to the Representative unopened. That day the Representative again transmitted the Note Verbale with a covering letter addressed to the Vice-President of the Military Command of Phnom Penh, requesting him to relay it to the appropriate authorities. No answer was received.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
It is clear that the Cambodian civil war was immediately followed by a well-planned and total revolution. There was a systematic evacuation of most cities, towns and villages. Thus, virtually the entire population is now living at large in the countryside.
In Phnom Penh one saw wives pushing their husbands in hospital beds down the streets as hospitals were evacuated. In the French Calmette Hospital a number of operations were interrupted and its staff put under armed supervision. By the end of two days the city was quiet, as virtually the entire population had left. The same pattern was evident in Kompong Chhnang, Purgat, Battan bang, Sisophon and Poipot and the intervening villages. The only exceptions were those previously occupied "liberated" villages, whose inhabitants had been recontioned by the Khmer Rouge.
Reports from persons brought in by the Khmer Rouge from the countryside indicated that there were no controls placed on people leaving Phnom Penh, and they were allowed to drive their cars or push their belongings to "centres de triage", situated approximately 14-18 kilometres from the city centre. At this point, men, women and children were separated, only the very young children being left with their mothers. They were then sent into the countryside.
Meantime a systematic looting of all commercial establishments and large houses was carried out by the Khmer Rouge soldiers as part of a preconceived policy, probably for the following reasons:
- to control the population and potential subversive elements by dispersing them to prevent any regrouping or resistance.
- to give the "city dwellers" a taste of the Khmer Rouge experience of living in the countryside for five years.
- to destroy the former system as the first step to creating a "new society".
- to destroy any concept of private property.
Although a "blood bath" was widely predicted, there was no evidence of this to any of our group. However, one of the probable reasons that the convoy was routed by trails rather than the main road between Phnom Penh and Kampong Chhnang was undoubtedly to avoid a large "centre de triage" and concentration camp where civilians and soldiers were being processed.
The Khmer Rouge troopo entering Phnom Penh were well armed and disciplined. Their leadership was impressive and formal in their contacts. The second group of troops encountered in Purgat were obviously of the second echelon and were somewhat more friendly, although still firm in their demands.
Finally, on leaving Phnom Penh we passed by the UNICEF office and it appeared completely intact.
There was some evidence that the Khmer Rouge were aware of UNICEF, and favourably disposed towards it. At no time were any negative comments expressed, as was the case with the International Red Cross and the American-supported agencies.
Further corroboration of this came from Major Spots Leopard, the Director of the British Save the Children Fund, who remained in his house for seven days with 22 children after the city fell. He was visited on two occasions by the Khmer Rouge authorities, and when he mentioned that he was working with UNICEF, received a very positive response.
However, the country remained under military control, and the most evident policy was that the Khmer Rouge wanted to organize their society along new and revolutionary lines by themselves. Only after they have established the broad framework of this society will they assess the type of outside assistance they will require and then probably request it on a very selective basis.
While "xenophobia" has been suggested, little evidence of this existed and foreigners were treated as well as Khmer nationals. Agencies and their personnel were not specifically expelled and one had the impression that they were asked to leave until the new authorities had a chance to reorganize their new society by themselves.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We are dealing with a new and original revolution, and it is extremely difficult to forecast the future in Cambodia. Nevertheless, it is probable that the present position will soften and some form of outside assistance will be welcomed, but not for some time.
UNICEF will wish to preserve its humanitarian role and there are a number of points which should be borne in mind in future discussions:
The Khmer Rouge troopo entering Phnom Penh were well armed and disciplined. Their leadership was impressive and formal in their contacts. The second group of troops encountered in Purgat were obviously of the second echelon and were somewhat more friendly, although still firm in their demands.
Finally, on leaving Phnom Penh we passed by the UNICEF office and it appeared completely intact.
There was some evidence that the Khmer Rouge were aware of UNICEF, and favourably disposed towards it. At no time were any negative comments expressed, as was the case with the International Red Cross and the American-supported agencies.
Further corroboration of this came from Major Spots Leopard, the Director of the British Save the Children Fund, who remained in his house for seven days with 22 children after the city fell. He was visited on two occasions by the Khmer Rouge authorities, and when he mentioned that he was working with UNICEF, received a very positive response.
However, the country remained under military control, and the most evident policy was that the Khmer Rouge wanted to organize their society along new and revolutionary lines by themselves. Only after they have established the broad framework of this society will they assess the type of outside assistance they will require and then probably request it on a very selective basis.
While "xenophobia" has been suggested, little evidence of this existed and foreigners were treated as well as Khmer nationals. Agencies and their personnel were not specifically expelled and one had the impression that they were asked to leave until the new authorities had a chance to reorganize their new society by themselves.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We are dealing with a new and original revolution, and it is extremely difficult to forecast the future in Cambodia. Nevertheless, it is probable that the present position will soften and some form of outside assistance will be welcomed, but not for some time.
UNICEF will wish to preserve its humanitarian role and there are a number of points which should be borne in mind in future discussions:
- an equality of relationship between the new revolutionary authorities and our agency should be stressed, particularly the idea of collaboration. Concepts of "giving or receiving” would probably not be acceptable to the new authorities.
- first assistance will probably be requested for the health, environmental sanitation, and possibly education areas, in the form of bulk supplies and equipment.
- the treatment accorded to UNICEF national staff, under the protection of the authorities of the country.
- the question of UNICEF property, including vehicles, supplies, personnel effects of staff and some $30,000 in US currency might also be raised.
Paul Ignatieff
UNICEF Representative
UNICEF Representative
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