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Ever more guidance has been produced without becoming any better, and we now have an online manual that doesn’t tell us much. Country office staff are bamboozled by the need to produce documents and reports whose meaning they no longer can understand. Programme Policy and Procedure sails below the radar of senior management; staff members have to feed an outmoded bureaucracy which no one has the guts to eliminate.
Many UNICEF staff continue to do great work – in spite of messy guidance and confused programme policy and strategy. The occupation with processes internal to UNICEF and the UN distracts from new development realities and UNICEF’s role as the most powerful advocate for children and their rights. UNICEF actions must be supported by a universally understood corporate identity, clear positions and directions, simple language, a minimum of paperwork and purposeful and efficient operations.
Here are 17 thoughts and recommendations to ready UNICEF for the future.
1. A U-turn without warning
2. Writing 6000 thousand words and saying nothing
3. Policy Change is the End Game
4. Development is a Political Process
5. Evidence and Chicken Bones
6. The UN reform got it upside down
7. Ersatz-Outcomes
8. The Nonsense of Matrix Management
9. National Ownership newly defined
10. The Tiring Talk about Capacity Gaps
11. Accountability
12. The Fog of Partnership
13.Deals for Children
14. The Theory of Change needs a Change
15. If – Then (for Connoisseurs and Nerds)
16. The Results Story
17. The Unsettled Debate about Strategic Planning
Annex: Milestones of a Reform Process
Early proposals were of poor quality, and UNICEF created country offices to help governments in the drafting. Money was disbursed to the government according to government work plans, approved by UNICEF. Until today, this concept is the basis of HACT. The management section of the CPD described how the government would make spending decisions and how money would flow through the ministries. UNICEF monitored the implementation of government work plans, and evaluated whether government actions lead to the expected results for children.
As practice evolved, UNICEF offices were slicing up the allocations, transferring money in tiny portions, and eventually used the funds for whatever they thought fit. In a complete reversal of the original concept, discussions now revolve around what UNICEF will be doing, not governments. Host governments have to approve UNICEF annual work plans. Many CPD narratives start with ‘UNICEF will do x and y’, and the management sections belabour how UNICEF will monitor its own actions.
There is ambiguity about the nature of the country programme, and what the CPD is to describe.
Does the CPD describe a ‘UNICEF supported programme’, where the government is ultimately accountable for the results, with UNICEF providing funding and inputs? Or does it describe a ‘UNICEF programme’, where the UNICEF country office gets the money and is accountable for delivering the result? Recent guidance, including the new PPPX, does nothing to explain and freely switches forth and back between both concepts.
Some practitioners will suggest that the truth is somewhere in the middle; that everything is done in partnership with the government; that UNICEF will always support action by governments, and that this debate is futile. But no amount of ignorance can gloss over the fundamental differences in the accountability regime. The two views cannot be reconciled: if we articulate results that only can be achieved by a government, then we cannot limit ourselves to describing our own actions. The current drawn-out CPD preparation forces UN agencies into contortions to suggest national ownership. Staff face ludicrous writing conflicts when trying to point at poor governance as an underlying cause of a development situation or the need to advocate for a change in government positions.
As we will see later, this ambivalence has been causing the disconnect between the Strategic Plan and the CPDs, and the irrelevance of many programming tools and data collection systems.
Rec 1: The nature of the country programme, and the resulting accountability of UNICEF and governments should be unambiguously clarified.
UNICEF’s raison d'être in a country is linked to the Basic Cooperation Agreement, which everyone agrees is outmoded beyond repair. No serious attempt of reform has been made, most likely for fear of not being able to propose an alternative and getting annihilated in the ensuing chaos.
Whether or not you can make sense of this phrase: it remains a mystery why it is part of the standard CPD text, and not a key section in the updated programme guidance. It would at least explain to country office staff why they have to go through the tortuous drafting process.
I can only hope that members of the Executive Board know why they are looking at a CPD. Next to this accountability fluff, it is not clear what decisions the Executive Board members are actually asked to take.
The Regular Resource allocations are determined by a Board-approved formula. Other Resource allocations are determined by past fundraising results, and will be readily adjusted when required. Any half-witted office includes text to confirm alignment with the rest of the UN and the Sustainable Development Goals, partnerships with the private sector, the push for innovations, gender sensitivity and a particular focus on the especially vulnerable.
UNICEF management has for some years now required the preparation of programme strategy notes (PSNs). They have to be submitted by country offices to their regional offices together with the draft CPD, to help regional advisors to understand what the proposed country programme actually is about. This is interesting. If UNICEF experts cannot make sense of the CPD text and require additional PSNs, how can we expect executive board members to reasonably appraise a CPD?
Look at it the other way. The maximum length of a CPD is 6000 words. These are more words than you would need to explain to your mother what your country programme really is about, and the challenges or difficulties to help children in that country. But we cannot say in the CPD that the government hasn’t paid enough attention to children; or that there is a lot of corruption; that the media is too controlled for raising awareness about human rights; that Parliamentarians refused to legislate higher expenditure for children; that vulnerable people are discriminated against. Nor can we say how we plan to create alliances with other agencies or work with civil society to bring about the necessary political pressure on the government to undertake the needed structural change.
Therefore, the CPD is neither a commitment from the host government for reforms that UNICEF could finance and help bring about; nor is it a candid account of UNICEF’s analysis and local strategies. The CPD is a useless document.
Rec2: The CPDs should be replaced by either (i) a commitment of the host government to conduct specific reforms; or (ii) an internal document describing the intent of UNICEF of how to create change for children in the host country.
How will pupils do their math when the UNICEF-supplied pencils are used up? Moreover, as UNICEF began to micromanage disbursements and directly commission activities, a mentality ensued in which UNICEF was doing things, and generations of UNICEF doers acted in a universe parallel to government policy and state budgets. Policy dialogue only edged its way into mainstream programming with a more conscious approach to engagement in Middle Income Countries.
Until today, advocacy cannot be part of a CPD or joint government-UNICEF work plans, and the resources used for advocacy are hidden from governments. This might not matter when resources for advocacy are comparatively small; it is monstrous if virtually all that UNICEF does is advocacy, as is the case in most middle income countries.
Yet, policy change is the end-game. If a development intervention is to be successful and sustainable, it requires a change of government policy and budgets. In middle income countries, which make up more than three-quarters of all programme countries, a change in government policy or government commitment to a certain reform may be the only UNICEF objective; in least developed countries, UNICEF may also co-finance some of the activities resulting from such change in government policy. Capacity building measures, such as training of teachers, or supplying commodities, are a consequence of policy change, not a precursor or an alternative.
Rec3: The role of Government policy, as the main determinant for children’s rights, should be unambiguously articulated in UNICEF communications.
Many UNICEF practitioners have a gut feeling about this. Political savviness is now a much sought skill. However, domestic politics have remained a no-go-area for the UN and UNICEF. The most recent guidance states that very sensitive issues may be avoided in the Situation Analysis, which is supposed to be a consensus document agreed with a government. Controversial issues could be mentioned in internal documents which might be secretly traded with donors. This abstinence from the political process is counterproductive, especially where progress does not depend on funding but on UNICEF’s global expertise.
Parliamentary debate is not about whether something is a good idea or not, but how to prioritize government investments and state revenue among the zillions of good ideas that exist. UNICEF has regularly been pushing governments to adopt policies without any budget considerations, just to complain later that the policies have not been implemented. It is time that we start taking internal government processes and debates seriously.
Where political agreement exists among constituents that improvements to services for children are a top priority, governments are likely to invest in these improvements and they are going to happen – even without UNICEF. If a good idea implies no costs to the national budget, if nobody loses his job and no-one’s feelings are getting hurt, the good idea will most likely be implemented. But most reforms or new policies or national programmes require trade-offs, and it is the task of politicians to find the most acceptable compromise. If there is no political agreement and the issue becomes sensitive, UNICEF as the non-partisan expert must get involved, to represent the global standards and the views and agreements of the world community, which people are entitled to know.
A political process is ‘good’ when all participants, including politicians and citizens, have access to the best knowledge and expertise available. The sensitive issues are where UNICEF adds the greatest value. Important milestones along the continuum of a typical political process are suggested in the Annex.
Rec 4.1: UNICEF must understand that development decisions by countries are the outcome of a political process in those countries.
Rec 4.2: UNICEF must analyse and understand the domestic and regional political context, and identify interests that inhibit or promote intended results.
Rec 4.3: UNICEF must be in the habit to have an opinion on topical issues, including the most sensitive issues, in its Situation Analysis, and its public communications.
Obviously, seemingly irrational policy decisions are being made. Development practitioners complain about politics that prevent good decisions to be taken. Interests are thought to be vested, and politicians are swayed by dark forces that have anything but the interest of children at their heart. The underlying assumption is that – unperturbed by bad politics – evidence will lead to a logical and convincing argument for how to best benefit children.
We know not only since the current American Presidency or the Brexit that evidence alone does not necessarily lead to rational policy decisions. People have different interests and priorities, and these often contradict each other. One group favours investments in early childhood programmes for migrant children, another favours a decent university for their own kids. Both sides have a cause, and both sides can produce evidence supporting their preference. Political decisions are the outcomes of negotiations and public debate. These negotiations involve many more things than evidence; they involve likes and dislikes, prejudice, passions, fake news, group think, peer pressure, and many more.
In the political discourse, evidence is an important element for us. But we cannot hope to sway a policy debate in our favour through evidence alone, especially when our good idea competes with another good idea of someone else. We need to sell our ideas, project our visions, listen to our opponents, and pull all stops in respect of our marketing, communication and alliance-building skills. We need to touch on emotions. UNICEF images and stories are moving people to give billions of Dollars every year, for children. Our images and stories can also move people to support good policies for children.
Rec.5. UNICEF must engage as a sought-after and passionate discussant in the domestic discourse on policies for children.
In any country, different priorities compete in different fields: investments in kindergarten compete with investments in university education; somebody wants to strengthen border controls and someone else wants to spend more money on integration and inclusion. Someone wants big money for digitalization; someone else wants to protect against unemployment. The decision to prioritize is the result of the political process, where all protagonists need to know the best arguments.
UN agencies can enrich and rationalize the often emotional and impulsive public discourse and political debate. It is high time that UN technocrats stop behaving “more Chinese than the Chinese”, and ditch their belief that they are able to determine a country’s development priorities. Governments are principally accountable to their citizens; any self-respecting official would primarily do what her constituents would want her to do. An alternative to the UNDAF (now UNSDCF) would be a marketplace where different UN agencies can present their best investment case to the government and the public.
Even a serious government official would want to hear the best arguments from potentially competing sectors or specialists, rather than listening to a lukewarm UNDAF compromise cooked up by a random team of comparably junior UN bureaucrats and consultants.
Rec 6: The UNDAF/UNSDCF is counterproductive, as it preempts rather than contributes to the domestic debate on development priorities and investments. It should be replaced with narratives making the case for development solutions, for public discussion.
There are those that argue that politics are a domestic affair that has nothing to do with the United Nations. This is a misunderstanding. The political process is an exchange of views, based on personal or group interests, the depth of knowledge, alliances, and many other factors. There is no absolute truth; in functioning democracies the outcome would reflect the preference of a majority. Of course, the majority can take a position that is not even in their own interest. The Brexit debate illustrates how badly such a process can be managed, even in an advanced democracy.
Where the debate concerns children, UNICEF represents the global consensus. It might be different from the view held by many people of a country. For example, the majority of people of a country and its government might have the view that young offenders should be imprisoned in order to learn a lesson; but they need to know that, globally, most people and governments think differently.
Many years ago, over-reacting to the critique that UNICEF was trying to do too much, management decided to focus. Instead of working on seven or twelve results, country offices should focus on two to four results only. As all the work remains important, activities and results are simply grouped under three or four Ersatz-outcomes, which consequently become very vague – such as all children will enjoy their right to good health; or children of all ages, including those with disabilities, will participate in inclusive quality education. Any so-called ‘prioritization’ or ‘strategic consensus’ exercise by UNICEF or the UN does nothing other than trying to group dozens of important topics under three or four woolly Ersatz-outcomes, that violate all tenets of results-based management.
This charade has significant operational downsides. Take violence. It has many facets: parental discipline for young children at home; bullying by peers in schools; online sexual violence; institutional violence and so forth. It is easy to imagine a major anti-violence initiative looking at legislation, conflict resolution, parent education and so on. Given the imperative of only allowing three outcomes, part of the anti-violence initiative has to take place under the Health Outcome, part under the Education Outcome, and part under a Protection Outcome (mixed up with other Protection Issues). Instead of giving the anti-violence initiative its own distinct identity, we are losing the synergies that we wanted to achieve. There will be no plausible anti-violence story and no coherent support to what could become a movement.
Consequently, outcome statements become vague and meaningless, and output matrices remain large. Add the different ways of UN organizations cutting the pie, and it is easy to see that senior managers will spend more time on managing matrices, trying to keep order among the cells and creating reports for different purposes, than actually managing their organization to support the results that governments want to achieve.
In the above example, the country will continue to work on the three mentioned health topics, and all three UN agencies do something useful. Why spend energy on crafting phony Ersatz-Outcomes and matrices that nobody other than a UN bureaucrat cares about? UN over-coordination saps energy badly needed for smarter engagement.
Rec 8: UNDAF/UNSDCF Results matrices do not add value; a simple mapping to indicate where UN agencies need to coordinate will do.
If, for a moment, everyone could just step back: Is there something such as national ownership in a country like the Sudan, the Comoros, India, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Turkey, Mexico, Angola, or – hypothetically – the USA and Germany – of a UNICEF CPD?
If something such as national ownership can be defined, then it is the nationwide discussion over the material or immaterial values at stake, and any needed change in national policy. The issue – or rather the debate around it – can be owned by the people of a country, if a sufficiently large public discourse is taking place. Owning means that there was adequate opportunity for decision-makers to consider the views of experts and all political forces in the final outcome of a good political process. For any issues concerning children, UNICEF should present the views of the global community. Of course, these are high stakes for fledgling democracies.
Likewise, government ownership manifests itself in the reforms it pursues. The government official who puts her signature under the national budget, investment plan or on a UN document needs to be informed by the public debate, not her own intuitions. UN support must adjust to and feed into the reforms. To be useful to a government, the UN must engage on the terms that the government sets – by providing inputs into their plans and reform programmes.
Rec 9: UNICEF must seek to encourage public discussion, not about its own plans, but of the development issues where a political solution must be found.
Most government officials belong to the privileged. They are well educated, have smart-phones and plenty of time to google. UNICEF staff must stop treating them as ignorant, especially in countries where UNICEF recruits former civil servants as the best and the brightest. We have to discard the unspoken premise that government officials are bumbling bureaucrats, who do not know the science or do not have the capacity to analyse what is best for them and their country. We need to realize that some officials may not have time for equity; or the type of equity that UNICEF favours; or that they have other priorities. We must stop saying that a person or group lacks capacity just because they do not share our views.
Of course, governments need UNICEF. Not always because of our superior expertise, but because we do the job that the equally educated but lower paid government staff find no time to do. This sounds depressing. We need to make the best of it. We need to go with the flow. We need to help build the political case. We need to treat officials and counterparts as individuals in full possession of their capacities, and understand the politics of their working environment.
Rec 10: UNICEF needs to revise its capacity building paradigm, in favour of a better view of the wider political and socio-economic context.
In daily life, accountability tends to be invisible. People only look for it when something goes wrong. They want to find a culprit, even though nobody knows what holding someone accountable means in the UN. Culprits are rarely found, and circumstances are blamed instead.
People have widely different views on what constitutes accountability. This has also to do with the mother tongues of our staff, where accountability often translates into more different denotations. It would be best to delete accountability from our vocabulary, and simply say what we mean.
Rethinking UNICEF
Insights from Outside the Bubble
Thoughts by Detlef Palm, September 2020
Woolly, bureaucratic, irrelevant and lost in process and jargon. We produce documents that nobody reads; and have a hard time telling results. Everything goes, and nothing really works. Something feels wrong.
Everything has changed
The world has changed, the role of development agencies has changed, UNICEF has changed. Many of our organizational structures and concepts are based on circumstances that no longer exist. They are rooted in theories and processes that are stuck in UNICEF’s mind, and which are obsolete in the real world. The perpetual debate about the strategic direction and responsibilities of divisions and offices is symptomatic of the confusion about what UNICEF is or meant to be.Ever more guidance has been produced without becoming any better, and we now have an online manual that doesn’t tell us much. Country office staff are bamboozled by the need to produce documents and reports whose meaning they no longer can understand. Programme Policy and Procedure sails below the radar of senior management; staff members have to feed an outmoded bureaucracy which no one has the guts to eliminate.
Many UNICEF staff continue to do great work – in spite of messy guidance and confused programme policy and strategy. The occupation with processes internal to UNICEF and the UN distracts from new development realities and UNICEF’s role as the most powerful advocate for children and their rights. UNICEF actions must be supported by a universally understood corporate identity, clear positions and directions, simple language, a minimum of paperwork and purposeful and efficient operations.
Here are 17 thoughts and recommendations to ready UNICEF for the future.
Contents
Everything has changed1. A U-turn without warning
2. Writing 6000 thousand words and saying nothing
3. Policy Change is the End Game
4. Development is a Political Process
5. Evidence and Chicken Bones
6. The UN reform got it upside down
7. Ersatz-Outcomes
8. The Nonsense of Matrix Management
9. National Ownership newly defined
10. The Tiring Talk about Capacity Gaps
11. Accountability
12. The Fog of Partnership
13.Deals for Children
14. The Theory of Change needs a Change
15. If – Then (for Connoisseurs and Nerds)
16. The Results Story
17. The Unsettled Debate about Strategic Planning
Annex: Milestones of a Reform Process
1. A U-turn without warning
Sixty or so years ago, underdevelopment was synonymous with lack of money and poor health. UNICEF was created as a fund. The Country Programme Document (CPD), in its original design, was a funding proposal from the host government to the UNICEF Executive Board. The CPD was telling that a country wanted to vaccinate its children and that the government needed money to do so.Early proposals were of poor quality, and UNICEF created country offices to help governments in the drafting. Money was disbursed to the government according to government work plans, approved by UNICEF. Until today, this concept is the basis of HACT. The management section of the CPD described how the government would make spending decisions and how money would flow through the ministries. UNICEF monitored the implementation of government work plans, and evaluated whether government actions lead to the expected results for children.
As practice evolved, UNICEF offices were slicing up the allocations, transferring money in tiny portions, and eventually used the funds for whatever they thought fit. In a complete reversal of the original concept, discussions now revolve around what UNICEF will be doing, not governments. Host governments have to approve UNICEF annual work plans. Many CPD narratives start with ‘UNICEF will do x and y’, and the management sections belabour how UNICEF will monitor its own actions.
There is ambiguity about the nature of the country programme, and what the CPD is to describe.
Does the CPD describe a ‘UNICEF supported programme’, where the government is ultimately accountable for the results, with UNICEF providing funding and inputs? Or does it describe a ‘UNICEF programme’, where the UNICEF country office gets the money and is accountable for delivering the result? Recent guidance, including the new PPPX, does nothing to explain and freely switches forth and back between both concepts.
Some practitioners will suggest that the truth is somewhere in the middle; that everything is done in partnership with the government; that UNICEF will always support action by governments, and that this debate is futile. But no amount of ignorance can gloss over the fundamental differences in the accountability regime. The two views cannot be reconciled: if we articulate results that only can be achieved by a government, then we cannot limit ourselves to describing our own actions. The current drawn-out CPD preparation forces UN agencies into contortions to suggest national ownership. Staff face ludicrous writing conflicts when trying to point at poor governance as an underlying cause of a development situation or the need to advocate for a change in government positions.
As we will see later, this ambivalence has been causing the disconnect between the Strategic Plan and the CPDs, and the irrelevance of many programming tools and data collection systems.
Rec 1: The nature of the country programme, and the resulting accountability of UNICEF and governments should be unambiguously clarified.
UNICEF’s raison d'être in a country is linked to the Basic Cooperation Agreement, which everyone agrees is outmoded beyond repair. No serious attempt of reform has been made, most likely for fear of not being able to propose an alternative and getting annihilated in the ensuing chaos.
2. Writing 6000 thousand words and saying nothing
The CPD is the bedrock of UNICEF’s work at the country level. Mandatory text, usually around the 40th paragraph, has it that the CPD serves as the primary unit of accountability to the Executive Board for results alignment and resources assigned to the programme at the country level.Whether or not you can make sense of this phrase: it remains a mystery why it is part of the standard CPD text, and not a key section in the updated programme guidance. It would at least explain to country office staff why they have to go through the tortuous drafting process.
I can only hope that members of the Executive Board know why they are looking at a CPD. Next to this accountability fluff, it is not clear what decisions the Executive Board members are actually asked to take.
The Regular Resource allocations are determined by a Board-approved formula. Other Resource allocations are determined by past fundraising results, and will be readily adjusted when required. Any half-witted office includes text to confirm alignment with the rest of the UN and the Sustainable Development Goals, partnerships with the private sector, the push for innovations, gender sensitivity and a particular focus on the especially vulnerable.
UNICEF management has for some years now required the preparation of programme strategy notes (PSNs). They have to be submitted by country offices to their regional offices together with the draft CPD, to help regional advisors to understand what the proposed country programme actually is about. This is interesting. If UNICEF experts cannot make sense of the CPD text and require additional PSNs, how can we expect executive board members to reasonably appraise a CPD?
Look at it the other way. The maximum length of a CPD is 6000 words. These are more words than you would need to explain to your mother what your country programme really is about, and the challenges or difficulties to help children in that country. But we cannot say in the CPD that the government hasn’t paid enough attention to children; or that there is a lot of corruption; that the media is too controlled for raising awareness about human rights; that Parliamentarians refused to legislate higher expenditure for children; that vulnerable people are discriminated against. Nor can we say how we plan to create alliances with other agencies or work with civil society to bring about the necessary political pressure on the government to undertake the needed structural change.
Therefore, the CPD is neither a commitment from the host government for reforms that UNICEF could finance and help bring about; nor is it a candid account of UNICEF’s analysis and local strategies. The CPD is a useless document.
Rec2: The CPDs should be replaced by either (i) a commitment of the host government to conduct specific reforms; or (ii) an internal document describing the intent of UNICEF of how to create change for children in the host country.
3. Policy Change is the End Game
UNICEF started out by funding activity by governments in cases where the country was too poor to finance itself. Hence, historically, governments did not have to make difficult policy decisions whether or not to finance the activities themselves; the UNICEF approach was counterproductive to ensuring sustainability.How will pupils do their math when the UNICEF-supplied pencils are used up? Moreover, as UNICEF began to micromanage disbursements and directly commission activities, a mentality ensued in which UNICEF was doing things, and generations of UNICEF doers acted in a universe parallel to government policy and state budgets. Policy dialogue only edged its way into mainstream programming with a more conscious approach to engagement in Middle Income Countries.
Until today, advocacy cannot be part of a CPD or joint government-UNICEF work plans, and the resources used for advocacy are hidden from governments. This might not matter when resources for advocacy are comparatively small; it is monstrous if virtually all that UNICEF does is advocacy, as is the case in most middle income countries.
Yet, policy change is the end-game. If a development intervention is to be successful and sustainable, it requires a change of government policy and budgets. In middle income countries, which make up more than three-quarters of all programme countries, a change in government policy or government commitment to a certain reform may be the only UNICEF objective; in least developed countries, UNICEF may also co-finance some of the activities resulting from such change in government policy. Capacity building measures, such as training of teachers, or supplying commodities, are a consequence of policy change, not a precursor or an alternative.
Rec3: The role of Government policy, as the main determinant for children’s rights, should be unambiguously articulated in UNICEF communications.
4. Development is a Political Process
UNICEF – as most UN agencies – works on the premise that everyone has good intentions, and that these intentions are similar among people and countries. If this was so, child deprivations would be things of the past. But as it were, other issues compete for attention and often crowd out marginalized children. The unit costs of reaching the last children are higher than for the average child; often, the majority population may not even want to provide equal opportunities and that extra budget for minority children. This all is to say that development and government provision of services and entitlements are a matter of choice and hence the outcome of a political process.Many UNICEF practitioners have a gut feeling about this. Political savviness is now a much sought skill. However, domestic politics have remained a no-go-area for the UN and UNICEF. The most recent guidance states that very sensitive issues may be avoided in the Situation Analysis, which is supposed to be a consensus document agreed with a government. Controversial issues could be mentioned in internal documents which might be secretly traded with donors. This abstinence from the political process is counterproductive, especially where progress does not depend on funding but on UNICEF’s global expertise.
Parliamentary debate is not about whether something is a good idea or not, but how to prioritize government investments and state revenue among the zillions of good ideas that exist. UNICEF has regularly been pushing governments to adopt policies without any budget considerations, just to complain later that the policies have not been implemented. It is time that we start taking internal government processes and debates seriously.
Where political agreement exists among constituents that improvements to services for children are a top priority, governments are likely to invest in these improvements and they are going to happen – even without UNICEF. If a good idea implies no costs to the national budget, if nobody loses his job and no-one’s feelings are getting hurt, the good idea will most likely be implemented. But most reforms or new policies or national programmes require trade-offs, and it is the task of politicians to find the most acceptable compromise. If there is no political agreement and the issue becomes sensitive, UNICEF as the non-partisan expert must get involved, to represent the global standards and the views and agreements of the world community, which people are entitled to know.
A political process is ‘good’ when all participants, including politicians and citizens, have access to the best knowledge and expertise available. The sensitive issues are where UNICEF adds the greatest value. Important milestones along the continuum of a typical political process are suggested in the Annex.
Rec 4.1: UNICEF must understand that development decisions by countries are the outcome of a political process in those countries.
Rec 4.2: UNICEF must analyse and understand the domestic and regional political context, and identify interests that inhibit or promote intended results.
Rec 4.3: UNICEF must be in the habit to have an opinion on topical issues, including the most sensitive issues, in its Situation Analysis, and its public communications.
5. Evidence and Chicken Bones
No doubt: we need to get the facts straight and we need evidence for our policy proposals. I am not the one who will dismiss an ounce of evidence. But I am profoundly perturbed to read in almost every UNICEF strategy paper that evidence-based advocacy will take place, that evidence will be produced and shared with counterparts and the public, that plans will be based on evidence, and that evidence-based policy recommendations will be made. I did not expect a UNICEF official to just make things up - did you? So why has evidence become the key word, as if our counterparts in host countries operate by throwing chicken bones?Obviously, seemingly irrational policy decisions are being made. Development practitioners complain about politics that prevent good decisions to be taken. Interests are thought to be vested, and politicians are swayed by dark forces that have anything but the interest of children at their heart. The underlying assumption is that – unperturbed by bad politics – evidence will lead to a logical and convincing argument for how to best benefit children.
We know not only since the current American Presidency or the Brexit that evidence alone does not necessarily lead to rational policy decisions. People have different interests and priorities, and these often contradict each other. One group favours investments in early childhood programmes for migrant children, another favours a decent university for their own kids. Both sides have a cause, and both sides can produce evidence supporting their preference. Political decisions are the outcomes of negotiations and public debate. These negotiations involve many more things than evidence; they involve likes and dislikes, prejudice, passions, fake news, group think, peer pressure, and many more.
In the political discourse, evidence is an important element for us. But we cannot hope to sway a policy debate in our favour through evidence alone, especially when our good idea competes with another good idea of someone else. We need to sell our ideas, project our visions, listen to our opponents, and pull all stops in respect of our marketing, communication and alliance-building skills. We need to touch on emotions. UNICEF images and stories are moving people to give billions of Dollars every year, for children. Our images and stories can also move people to support good policies for children.
Rec.5. UNICEF must engage as a sought-after and passionate discussant in the domestic discourse on policies for children.
6. The UN reform got it upside down
Those who know me, know my distaste for the direction of the UN reform, which has been working to obliterate the entire system. I trust that – on the strength of its mission - UNICEF will be among the remains that rise from the ashes, and here is my analysis on how to do it better next time:In any country, different priorities compete in different fields: investments in kindergarten compete with investments in university education; somebody wants to strengthen border controls and someone else wants to spend more money on integration and inclusion. Someone wants big money for digitalization; someone else wants to protect against unemployment. The decision to prioritize is the result of the political process, where all protagonists need to know the best arguments.
UN agencies can enrich and rationalize the often emotional and impulsive public discourse and political debate. It is high time that UN technocrats stop behaving “more Chinese than the Chinese”, and ditch their belief that they are able to determine a country’s development priorities. Governments are principally accountable to their citizens; any self-respecting official would primarily do what her constituents would want her to do. An alternative to the UNDAF (now UNSDCF) would be a marketplace where different UN agencies can present their best investment case to the government and the public.
Even a serious government official would want to hear the best arguments from potentially competing sectors or specialists, rather than listening to a lukewarm UNDAF compromise cooked up by a random team of comparably junior UN bureaucrats and consultants.
Rec 6: The UNDAF/UNSDCF is counterproductive, as it preempts rather than contributes to the domestic debate on development priorities and investments. It should be replaced with narratives making the case for development solutions, for public discussion.
There are those that argue that politics are a domestic affair that has nothing to do with the United Nations. This is a misunderstanding. The political process is an exchange of views, based on personal or group interests, the depth of knowledge, alliances, and many other factors. There is no absolute truth; in functioning democracies the outcome would reflect the preference of a majority. Of course, the majority can take a position that is not even in their own interest. The Brexit debate illustrates how badly such a process can be managed, even in an advanced democracy.
Where the debate concerns children, UNICEF represents the global consensus. It might be different from the view held by many people of a country. For example, the majority of people of a country and its government might have the view that young offenders should be imprisoned in order to learn a lesson; but they need to know that, globally, most people and governments think differently.
7. Ersatz-Outcomes
The typical country office concerns itself with seven to twelve distinct programme themes. Larger offices may have more. This was the case thirty years ago, and it still is the situation today. No UNICEF Strategic Plan has ever managed to change this. I believe that even small offices can deal with seven or eight distinct themes and achieve significant progress in some of them.Many years ago, over-reacting to the critique that UNICEF was trying to do too much, management decided to focus. Instead of working on seven or twelve results, country offices should focus on two to four results only. As all the work remains important, activities and results are simply grouped under three or four Ersatz-outcomes, which consequently become very vague – such as all children will enjoy their right to good health; or children of all ages, including those with disabilities, will participate in inclusive quality education. Any so-called ‘prioritization’ or ‘strategic consensus’ exercise by UNICEF or the UN does nothing other than trying to group dozens of important topics under three or four woolly Ersatz-outcomes, that violate all tenets of results-based management.
This charade has significant operational downsides. Take violence. It has many facets: parental discipline for young children at home; bullying by peers in schools; online sexual violence; institutional violence and so forth. It is easy to imagine a major anti-violence initiative looking at legislation, conflict resolution, parent education and so on. Given the imperative of only allowing three outcomes, part of the anti-violence initiative has to take place under the Health Outcome, part under the Education Outcome, and part under a Protection Outcome (mixed up with other Protection Issues). Instead of giving the anti-violence initiative its own distinct identity, we are losing the synergies that we wanted to achieve. There will be no plausible anti-violence story and no coherent support to what could become a movement.
Rec. 7: Distinct children’s issues and respective programme initiatives should have their own outcome. The requirement to aggregate potential results-stories into a small number of fake Ersatz-outcomes should be discontinued.
8. The Nonsense of Matrix Management
In the interagency arena, much energy continues to be spent on UNDAF/UNSDCF results matrices, and on identifying indicators for outcomes that capture inputs from agencies with extremely diverse mandates. In one country, IAEA was involved with radiation therapy for cancer treatment; UNICEF was concerned about the access of minority children to early childhood services; and WHO worried about smoking. Ostensibly to not burden counterparts with a large number of outputs, a single outcome was crafted, that should represent the results delivered by the three agencies. The reader is invited to give it a try.Consequently, outcome statements become vague and meaningless, and output matrices remain large. Add the different ways of UN organizations cutting the pie, and it is easy to see that senior managers will spend more time on managing matrices, trying to keep order among the cells and creating reports for different purposes, than actually managing their organization to support the results that governments want to achieve.
In the above example, the country will continue to work on the three mentioned health topics, and all three UN agencies do something useful. Why spend energy on crafting phony Ersatz-Outcomes and matrices that nobody other than a UN bureaucrat cares about? UN over-coordination saps energy badly needed for smarter engagement.
Rec 8: UNDAF/UNSDCF Results matrices do not add value; a simple mapping to indicate where UN agencies need to coordinate will do.
9. National Ownership newly defined
Planning gurus and UNDAF enthusiasts continue to emphasize the importance of national ownership. Government partners have to be involved from the beginning. And some young people, too. They all must shape our plans. National ownership of our plans will be ensured by government sending an official government request when the office submits the CPD to the UNICEF Executive Board; the Resident Coordinator is convinced of national ownership if a Minister shows up at the opening of an UNDAF meeting and doesn’t object to the proceedings. Hardliners deduce national ownership when the government approves UN work plans.If, for a moment, everyone could just step back: Is there something such as national ownership in a country like the Sudan, the Comoros, India, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Turkey, Mexico, Angola, or – hypothetically – the USA and Germany – of a UNICEF CPD?
If something such as national ownership can be defined, then it is the nationwide discussion over the material or immaterial values at stake, and any needed change in national policy. The issue – or rather the debate around it – can be owned by the people of a country, if a sufficiently large public discourse is taking place. Owning means that there was adequate opportunity for decision-makers to consider the views of experts and all political forces in the final outcome of a good political process. For any issues concerning children, UNICEF should present the views of the global community. Of course, these are high stakes for fledgling democracies.
Likewise, government ownership manifests itself in the reforms it pursues. The government official who puts her signature under the national budget, investment plan or on a UN document needs to be informed by the public debate, not her own intuitions. UN support must adjust to and feed into the reforms. To be useful to a government, the UN must engage on the terms that the government sets – by providing inputs into their plans and reform programmes.
Rec 9: UNICEF must seek to encourage public discussion, not about its own plans, but of the development issues where a political solution must be found.
10. The Tiring Talk about Capacity Gaps
Looking through recent-vintage CPDs and lacklustre Programme Strategy Notes, capacity building is the staple of the UNICEF operative. Most documents reflect a crude worldview, where host countries are developing and lack knowledge and capacities. Allegedly, UNICEF staff plan to dig up data unknown to the government; train government staff unable to read simple statistics; provide causality and determinant frameworks that explain the connection between cause and effect; and show the pathway to eternal happiness.Most government officials belong to the privileged. They are well educated, have smart-phones and plenty of time to google. UNICEF staff must stop treating them as ignorant, especially in countries where UNICEF recruits former civil servants as the best and the brightest. We have to discard the unspoken premise that government officials are bumbling bureaucrats, who do not know the science or do not have the capacity to analyse what is best for them and their country. We need to realize that some officials may not have time for equity; or the type of equity that UNICEF favours; or that they have other priorities. We must stop saying that a person or group lacks capacity just because they do not share our views.
Of course, governments need UNICEF. Not always because of our superior expertise, but because we do the job that the equally educated but lower paid government staff find no time to do. This sounds depressing. We need to make the best of it. We need to go with the flow. We need to help build the political case. We need to treat officials and counterparts as individuals in full possession of their capacities, and understand the politics of their working environment.
Rec 10: UNICEF needs to revise its capacity building paradigm, in favour of a better view of the wider political and socio-economic context.
11. Accountability
Every now and then, accountability is hotly being discussed. This is usually the case when someone feels that her office should be allocated more resources, because it has unfunded accountabilities. This, of course, is complete nonsense, as nobody has to account for money that wasn’t received.In daily life, accountability tends to be invisible. People only look for it when something goes wrong. They want to find a culprit, even though nobody knows what holding someone accountable means in the UN. Culprits are rarely found, and circumstances are blamed instead.
People have widely different views on what constitutes accountability. This has also to do with the mother tongues of our staff, where accountability often translates into more different denotations. It would be best to delete accountability from our vocabulary, and simply say what we mean.
- Most frequently, UN staff confound accountability and responsibility, which is not the same. One division is responsible for programme guidance, and another for evaluations. Job descriptions explain the responsibilities or tasks of individuals. Work related targets or results can be set. This in itself does not yet carry any accountability.
- UN staff often use the term accountability to describe an ethical obligation or desirable conduct. An ‘accountable staff member’ emulates positive behaviours, is serious about her job, has the goals of her organization on her mind, is conscious about the needs of her clients, and admits errors. However, standards of conduct for the International Civil Service, or expected behaviours form part of the employment contract or the oath of office, and should be reviewed under these terms.
- Sometimes, contractual obligations are unnecessarily referred to as accountability.
- Accountability is evoked when an organization delegates decision-making authority in form of a budget and staff time, access to organizational infrastructure and networks, or the use of the brand, and more. Typically, the manager decides how to use the budget, what type of staff he needs, how staff shall spend their time, or with whom to interact. Where results remained below expectations, the manager has to explain his decisions and non-decisions, and account for what he did (or did not do) with the money and all the other assets.
Accountability is for the good use, to the fullest extent, of the resources put under a manager’s authority, in the pursuit of agreed results. It follows that “accountability for results” does not exist. There could be many reasons beyond the manager’s control, for not achieving a result; including an initial underestimation (by his predecessor) of the needed resources. Conversely, someone else could have achieved the agreed result, but wasted millions of Dollars. Holding someone accountable, means asking the person to pay for damage done by not taking reasonable decisions.
Rec 11: UNICEF should adopt and popularize a clear understanding of accountability
All this would be nothing to write about, if the term partnership would not – deliberately or by chance – obfuscate the accountability of UNICEF for the good use of its resources in the pursuit of planned results. The liberal use of the term partnership in describing the relationship to the host government glosses over the failure to define the different obligations of each party. The two different obligations should be clarified, before the partnership commences.
Presently, the common standard section on government commitments in the Country Programme Action Plans or their UN equivalent limits itself to require: the appointment of officials that make themselves available to UNICEF for discussions and meetings; permission for UNICEF to raise funds from donors; agreement for UNICEF to spend money on NGOs; and agreement to account for supplies and cash provided by UNICEF. There is no place where a government would commit to carry out the expected reforms or policy changes.
The term mutual accountability only exists in the UN bubble and parts of the aid community, not in the real world. Mutual accountability was introduced by UN reformers, who could not force clarity about the nature of the country programme, as pointed out in section one. Their thinking goes as follows: Somehow the UN is trying hard to achieve results for children, but governments should also do something. The achievement of the common results depends on the actions of both partners. However, this doesn’t make the two partners ‘mutually’ accountable to each other for those results. Each party remains accountable to those who provided them with the resources and the authority over these resources. Mutual accountability muddles the picture, and has the gladly accepted side effect that successes can be appropriated and failures explained away, as needed.
Rec 12. UNICEF should clearly articulate its expectations vis-à-vis government and partners.
A funding agreement is a contract: you give me money and I deliver a result. Except, of course, where unforeseen circumstances, a change in government, a far-away flood and the predictable drought, but certainly not bad planning from our side, prevented us from delivering the promised result. There will be no refund.
You don’t “partner” with the grocery store when you order your supplies. In real life, and in real partnerships, it is not customary that one party pays the other. In a real partnership, both parties give something other than money, so that the result provides a greater benefit than trying it alone.
For public-private partnerships, this means first and foremost that the government will have to make concessions to the private sector, for companies to adjust their policies, practices or investments for the benefits of the public good.
This is less complicated than it sounds. For example, the government commits to subsidize companies to establish workplaces for young people with disabilities. Everybody wins. Government can lower recurrent disability benefits, more young people with disabilities can participate in meaningful work, and companies can better manage the creation of specialized workplaces.
Where is UNICEF? UNICEF is the broker, the agency that generates the ideas for those Deals for Children, between the host government and the private sector of that country. If we are getting good at it, donors and banks will drown us in money.
Rec 13: UNICEF should systematically prepare and document successful Deals for Children. The term ‘deal’ has been contaminated by the greatest dealmaker of all times. But someone will find another word.
Meanwhile, I agree with many colleagues that UNICEF got it completely wrong, that the guidance is useless, and that the TOC of the Strategic Plan is not a theory of change. Most TOCs prepared by country offices are colourful but non-compelling graphics, stuffed with corporate buzzwords, resembling plates of pasta where the spaghetti work their way around bubbles of cause and effect. The analysis follows an uninspiring pattern: for children to thrive, the country needs capacitated service providers, good policies, and more awareness of healthy lifestyles. Therefore UNICEF will train people, create evidence so better policies will be adopted, and have a communication campaign. Of course in partnership with others. Only an earthquake might risk our success – and perhaps lack of commitment from the government.
I don’t believe that anyone but the author is ready to look at such a TOC for even a minute.
A causality analysis, conceptual framework, Problem Tree, Result Tree, Logical Framework, MoRES, Determinants, a TOC, and other paraphernalia of results-based management all serve the same purpose. They are trying to identify investments or actions needed to achieve a result; and to test and explain the logic of what an agency is trying to do. Trust me, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with any of these. Naturally, not all guidance has been brilliant. But isn’t it a mystery that generations of serious UNICEF staff members never felt comfortable with any of these tools, and UNICEF keeps on developing new ones every couple of years?
First, the ambiguous nature of the country programme (section one) is to blame. If you think the government is the primary or implementing actor committed to pursue the agreed result, then the TOC should be replaced with some scientific references of what needs to be done, and the office should hand over a cheque. If you think that UNICEF is delivering the results, you should analyse why the country hasn’t made sufficient progress, and sketch out how you will get the government to get its act together. There is no middle way; the first document is official, the other is internal.
Second, ersatz-outcomes (section 7) violate all tenets of results based management. Planned results must be specific, smart and correctly articulated; a blah-blah outcome will cause a blah-blah TOC.
You may have figured by now that I favour UNICEF to participate in public discourse and political debate. The TOC is the plausible narrative on how UNICEF plans to get the country to adopt good policies for children; it is the prediction of the sequence of events or milestones that culminate in sustainable system- or behaviour change. With a periodically reviewed TOC, an office will be able to answer, at any time, the question by managers, auditors or evaluators: What the hell were you thinking when you spent 200,000 USD on this and that? How did you think this would lead to the expected result?
Rec 14: UNICEF should revise guidance on the Theory of Change, as a tool for programme development, accountability, evaluation and telling results-stories.
For connoisseurs and nerds, the next section goes into little more detail on what a TOC is.
Therefore, if we really want the TOC to describe the logic of our interventions, if we want to use it to assess whether we achieved what we promised, if we want to help evaluators to appraise our performance or contributions, and if we want to tell an interesting results story, then the TOC is our prediction of the chain of events that lead to the anticipated change.
The breakthrough in most development challenges are political decisions, such as to adopt a new policy, to spend a larger portion of the national budget on vulnerable groups, or to re-distribute decision-making powers. These are the decisions that UNICEF must seek to influence. A good TOC describes how we will be going about it.
A hypothetical example from the area of juvenile justice: “If we find a group of likeminded ministry officials and expose them to success stories in neighbouring countries, and if we get important embassies and development agencies to support our views, and if we win the trust of the Minister and promise to support any trainings needed for this intervention, then we might persuade him to send a proposal for a change in legislation to Parliament. If we at the same time seek out friendly journalists to thematise the benefits of restorative justice in their news magazines and work with CSOs and young people to fuel the public discourse, the legislators will approve the minister’s bill in parliament, … and fewer juvenile offenders will be imprisoned.”
Now, any assumptions and risks can easily be identified: there is a risk that the success stories in neighbouring countries fail to impress our government colleagues; we assume we will find support among the embassies for the reform of juvenile justice, but there is the risk that they don’t care. We assume that the public discourse will sway the legislators, but there is a risk that conservative populists dominate the debate. We will test our assumptions and refine our approach, and so it goes.
The sequence of anticipated events is normally in the mind of representatives and senior staff; when something unexpected happens or something gets in the way, we add or change the interventions – we adjust our theory of change as we go along.
Rec 15: A TOC should be the story of how UNICEF envisages to influence a change in government policy and programmes
DfiD has been among the agencies that forced UNICEF to report on the total number of children reached with something. There are certainly people out there for which this is enough information. For anyone interested in knowing what difference her money has made, the report is not saying much. What does it mean that ‘children have been reached’, or ‘UNICEF worked to improve learning outcomes’, or ‘UNICEF supported efforts to improve services’? What is the difference that we made? What did UNICEF in Nigeria spend its 330 million Dollars for and to what effect, or 580 million Dollar in Yemen?
UNICEF has built a monster database, with thousands of indicators, the RAM, and an assortment of purpose-built reports. But most UNICEF offices are busy bringing about transformational change, which has little to do with distributing pills and exercise books.
Country office annual reports are shrouded in discussion of strategy, and different pieces of an intervention tend to be scattered in different sections (for example on innovation; gender; and partnerships). The charade of focusing on three Ersatz-outcomes, while working on twelve distinct issues (see section 7) adds to the confusion. Annual reports are a pain to read, and it is difficult to see any good results story, if there is any.
A good, plausible results story has a beginning and an end; it must describe the issue to be addressed, the national reform effort, the UNICEF contribution, and the state of progress or final result. It shows UNICEF’s catalytic role in the progress made by the country. A good and plausible results story is the pinnacle of results based management.
Rec 16: To explain the difference it makes, UNICEF must make more use of storytelling. Country Office annual reports should focus on interesting results- stories.
At its inception, a TOC is the prediction of the results story. Upon completion of an initiative, the updated TOC is the results story that shows the difference that UNICEF has made.
Strategic plans come in many shapes and forms; there is no fixed format; its main purpose is to give clear directions. If it continues to invite debate, then there is something wrong with it.
The 2018 – 2021 Strategic Plan attempts to aggregate UNICEF’s country programmes. It sketches the global situation of children and has a list of suitably general outcomes. It commits UNICEF to eight generic strategies. Corresponding to a Country Programme Document, the Strategic Plan can be likened to a World Programme Document.
At the outset I observed that the nature of the country programme and the CPD is unclear. Aggregating something that is unclear will not create clarity. The unhappiness of staff with the Strategic Plan and the continuing management dilemmas have their origin in the conceptual confusion surrounding the nature of our country programmes.
As we muddle through with what we have, the Strategic Plan aka the World Programme Document is written as a funding proposal - just like the CPDs. It promises that UNICEF will help wherever children are in need; and it lists the desirable attributes that one would expect from an aid organization: UNICEF will engage in partnerships, create evidence, innovate and manage with excellence. I didn’t expect UNICEF to have sloppy data systems, be genderblind, or employ staff who don’t know what they are doing; so all this is not very enlightening.
A strategic plan has to do with strategic decisions, of which UNICEF seems to have taken none. Purely hypothetically, these could read similar to: In order to reduce overlap with other development agencies, UNICEF will let half of its health specialists go and hire lawyers instead. These lawyers will help governments to put in place legislation needed for the protection of children from violence, discrimination, abuse and neglect. Purely hypothetically. Does anyone believe that UNICEF could take such a bold – strategic - decision?
Strategic decisions are taken on the basis of the evolving context, the presence of other actors, an analysis of one’s own strengths and weaknesses, comparative advantage and where one can add the most value. Since UNICEF is not taking any strategic decisions, none of this has appeared in the Strategic Plan. In contrast, strategic choices usually are made about what to do and what not to do, or how to shift resources (e.g. from health to legal expertise). At the minimum, the strategic choice is between doing the same as before or doing something different.
Our own organizational goals, for which we need to make strategic (financial, human resource) investment choices, could include: be invited at significant policy tables; be the world authority on children as a knowledge resource; make vaccine cheaper; be within 24 hours at the crisis site; generate a significant volume of successfully negotiated deals for children, ….
Rec. 17: The Strategic Plan must explain UNICEF’s decisions on what to do and what not to do, and how to reallocate its own resources accordingly.
Rec 11: UNICEF should adopt and popularize a clear understanding of accountability
12. The Fog of Partnership
Ever since UNICEF was accused of acting in isolation without considering the efforts of development partners, UNICEF staff have to document that they are talking to others. Every strategy paper must contain a section on partnerships. It dawned even on the most passionate UNICEF staff that impact and outcome results cannot be achieved by UNICEF alone. No words are too bombastic to refer to the host government as partners in UNICEF’s quest to save the children of the world.All this would be nothing to write about, if the term partnership would not – deliberately or by chance – obfuscate the accountability of UNICEF for the good use of its resources in the pursuit of planned results. The liberal use of the term partnership in describing the relationship to the host government glosses over the failure to define the different obligations of each party. The two different obligations should be clarified, before the partnership commences.
Presently, the common standard section on government commitments in the Country Programme Action Plans or their UN equivalent limits itself to require: the appointment of officials that make themselves available to UNICEF for discussions and meetings; permission for UNICEF to raise funds from donors; agreement for UNICEF to spend money on NGOs; and agreement to account for supplies and cash provided by UNICEF. There is no place where a government would commit to carry out the expected reforms or policy changes.
The term mutual accountability only exists in the UN bubble and parts of the aid community, not in the real world. Mutual accountability was introduced by UN reformers, who could not force clarity about the nature of the country programme, as pointed out in section one. Their thinking goes as follows: Somehow the UN is trying hard to achieve results for children, but governments should also do something. The achievement of the common results depends on the actions of both partners. However, this doesn’t make the two partners ‘mutually’ accountable to each other for those results. Each party remains accountable to those who provided them with the resources and the authority over these resources. Mutual accountability muddles the picture, and has the gladly accepted side effect that successes can be appropriated and failures explained away, as needed.
Rec 12. UNICEF should clearly articulate its expectations vis-à-vis government and partners.
13.Deals for Children
The tighter the government budget, the greater the calls for public-private partnerships. Public private partnerships are now the major hype, except inside UNICEF, which maintains separate divisions for public and private partnerships. For the UN, partnership is also a euphemism for asking for and receiving money, and much of the two divisions’ efforts goes into fundraising from government and the private sector, respectively.A funding agreement is a contract: you give me money and I deliver a result. Except, of course, where unforeseen circumstances, a change in government, a far-away flood and the predictable drought, but certainly not bad planning from our side, prevented us from delivering the promised result. There will be no refund.
You don’t “partner” with the grocery store when you order your supplies. In real life, and in real partnerships, it is not customary that one party pays the other. In a real partnership, both parties give something other than money, so that the result provides a greater benefit than trying it alone.
For public-private partnerships, this means first and foremost that the government will have to make concessions to the private sector, for companies to adjust their policies, practices or investments for the benefits of the public good.
This is less complicated than it sounds. For example, the government commits to subsidize companies to establish workplaces for young people with disabilities. Everybody wins. Government can lower recurrent disability benefits, more young people with disabilities can participate in meaningful work, and companies can better manage the creation of specialized workplaces.
Where is UNICEF? UNICEF is the broker, the agency that generates the ideas for those Deals for Children, between the host government and the private sector of that country. If we are getting good at it, donors and banks will drown us in money.
Rec 13: UNICEF should systematically prepare and document successful Deals for Children. The term ‘deal’ has been contaminated by the greatest dealmaker of all times. But someone will find another word.
14. The Theory of Change needs a Change
The Theory of Change (TOC) is the new kid on the block. Actually, it is a few years old, and we could witness how a good concept got bungled beyond recognition. I do like the original concept, and I will tell you my version in a minute.Meanwhile, I agree with many colleagues that UNICEF got it completely wrong, that the guidance is useless, and that the TOC of the Strategic Plan is not a theory of change. Most TOCs prepared by country offices are colourful but non-compelling graphics, stuffed with corporate buzzwords, resembling plates of pasta where the spaghetti work their way around bubbles of cause and effect. The analysis follows an uninspiring pattern: for children to thrive, the country needs capacitated service providers, good policies, and more awareness of healthy lifestyles. Therefore UNICEF will train people, create evidence so better policies will be adopted, and have a communication campaign. Of course in partnership with others. Only an earthquake might risk our success – and perhaps lack of commitment from the government.
I don’t believe that anyone but the author is ready to look at such a TOC for even a minute.
A causality analysis, conceptual framework, Problem Tree, Result Tree, Logical Framework, MoRES, Determinants, a TOC, and other paraphernalia of results-based management all serve the same purpose. They are trying to identify investments or actions needed to achieve a result; and to test and explain the logic of what an agency is trying to do. Trust me, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with any of these. Naturally, not all guidance has been brilliant. But isn’t it a mystery that generations of serious UNICEF staff members never felt comfortable with any of these tools, and UNICEF keeps on developing new ones every couple of years?
First, the ambiguous nature of the country programme (section one) is to blame. If you think the government is the primary or implementing actor committed to pursue the agreed result, then the TOC should be replaced with some scientific references of what needs to be done, and the office should hand over a cheque. If you think that UNICEF is delivering the results, you should analyse why the country hasn’t made sufficient progress, and sketch out how you will get the government to get its act together. There is no middle way; the first document is official, the other is internal.
Second, ersatz-outcomes (section 7) violate all tenets of results based management. Planned results must be specific, smart and correctly articulated; a blah-blah outcome will cause a blah-blah TOC.
You may have figured by now that I favour UNICEF to participate in public discourse and political debate. The TOC is the plausible narrative on how UNICEF plans to get the country to adopt good policies for children; it is the prediction of the sequence of events or milestones that culminate in sustainable system- or behaviour change. With a periodically reviewed TOC, an office will be able to answer, at any time, the question by managers, auditors or evaluators: What the hell were you thinking when you spent 200,000 USD on this and that? How did you think this would lead to the expected result?
Rec 14: UNICEF should revise guidance on the Theory of Change, as a tool for programme development, accountability, evaluation and telling results-stories.
For connoisseurs and nerds, the next section goes into little more detail on what a TOC is.
15. If – Then (for Connoisseurs and Nerds)
The one thing that most staff members remember about a Theory of Change (TOC), is that it must contain a long sentence with several ifs and at least one then. Such as in: if service providers have sufficient capacity, and if the government adopts a good policy, and if parents are aware, then all children will thrive and learn. The problem with this statement is that it contains nothing new; you don’t need a degree in development science – or any degree - to know that a service can only be provided when the service providers are sufficiently capacitated. Another challenge is that it describes the conditions that have to be put in place largely by a government. For example, UNICEF may help to draft a good policy but it needs to be adopted by the Government.Therefore, if we really want the TOC to describe the logic of our interventions, if we want to use it to assess whether we achieved what we promised, if we want to help evaluators to appraise our performance or contributions, and if we want to tell an interesting results story, then the TOC is our prediction of the chain of events that lead to the anticipated change.
The breakthrough in most development challenges are political decisions, such as to adopt a new policy, to spend a larger portion of the national budget on vulnerable groups, or to re-distribute decision-making powers. These are the decisions that UNICEF must seek to influence. A good TOC describes how we will be going about it.
A hypothetical example from the area of juvenile justice: “If we find a group of likeminded ministry officials and expose them to success stories in neighbouring countries, and if we get important embassies and development agencies to support our views, and if we win the trust of the Minister and promise to support any trainings needed for this intervention, then we might persuade him to send a proposal for a change in legislation to Parliament. If we at the same time seek out friendly journalists to thematise the benefits of restorative justice in their news magazines and work with CSOs and young people to fuel the public discourse, the legislators will approve the minister’s bill in parliament, … and fewer juvenile offenders will be imprisoned.”
Now, any assumptions and risks can easily be identified: there is a risk that the success stories in neighbouring countries fail to impress our government colleagues; we assume we will find support among the embassies for the reform of juvenile justice, but there is the risk that they don’t care. We assume that the public discourse will sway the legislators, but there is a risk that conservative populists dominate the debate. We will test our assumptions and refine our approach, and so it goes.
The sequence of anticipated events is normally in the mind of representatives and senior staff; when something unexpected happens or something gets in the way, we add or change the interventions – we adjust our theory of change as we go along.
Rec 15: A TOC should be the story of how UNICEF envisages to influence a change in government policy and programmes
16. The Results Story
Twenty-thousand, hundred-thousand, one million, twenty million, sixty-five million. This is the number of children touched by a UNICEF intervention, according to the 2018 UNICEF annual report. The report inspires awe. If the aim is to excite donors, the writers have done a good job.DfiD has been among the agencies that forced UNICEF to report on the total number of children reached with something. There are certainly people out there for which this is enough information. For anyone interested in knowing what difference her money has made, the report is not saying much. What does it mean that ‘children have been reached’, or ‘UNICEF worked to improve learning outcomes’, or ‘UNICEF supported efforts to improve services’? What is the difference that we made? What did UNICEF in Nigeria spend its 330 million Dollars for and to what effect, or 580 million Dollar in Yemen?
UNICEF has built a monster database, with thousands of indicators, the RAM, and an assortment of purpose-built reports. But most UNICEF offices are busy bringing about transformational change, which has little to do with distributing pills and exercise books.
Country office annual reports are shrouded in discussion of strategy, and different pieces of an intervention tend to be scattered in different sections (for example on innovation; gender; and partnerships). The charade of focusing on three Ersatz-outcomes, while working on twelve distinct issues (see section 7) adds to the confusion. Annual reports are a pain to read, and it is difficult to see any good results story, if there is any.
A good, plausible results story has a beginning and an end; it must describe the issue to be addressed, the national reform effort, the UNICEF contribution, and the state of progress or final result. It shows UNICEF’s catalytic role in the progress made by the country. A good and plausible results story is the pinnacle of results based management.
Rec 16: To explain the difference it makes, UNICEF must make more use of storytelling. Country Office annual reports should focus on interesting results- stories.
At its inception, a TOC is the prediction of the results story. Upon completion of an initiative, the updated TOC is the results story that shows the difference that UNICEF has made.
17. The Unsettled Debate about Strategic Planning
The repositioning and alignment exercise observed ‘’… an unsettled and misplaced debate around the nature and purpose of the Strategic Plan (framework or plan) as well as a lack of corporate agreement on the extent of alignment between UNICEF’s Strategic Plan and Country Programmes.’’Strategic plans come in many shapes and forms; there is no fixed format; its main purpose is to give clear directions. If it continues to invite debate, then there is something wrong with it.
The 2018 – 2021 Strategic Plan attempts to aggregate UNICEF’s country programmes. It sketches the global situation of children and has a list of suitably general outcomes. It commits UNICEF to eight generic strategies. Corresponding to a Country Programme Document, the Strategic Plan can be likened to a World Programme Document.
At the outset I observed that the nature of the country programme and the CPD is unclear. Aggregating something that is unclear will not create clarity. The unhappiness of staff with the Strategic Plan and the continuing management dilemmas have their origin in the conceptual confusion surrounding the nature of our country programmes.
As we muddle through with what we have, the Strategic Plan aka the World Programme Document is written as a funding proposal - just like the CPDs. It promises that UNICEF will help wherever children are in need; and it lists the desirable attributes that one would expect from an aid organization: UNICEF will engage in partnerships, create evidence, innovate and manage with excellence. I didn’t expect UNICEF to have sloppy data systems, be genderblind, or employ staff who don’t know what they are doing; so all this is not very enlightening.
A strategic plan has to do with strategic decisions, of which UNICEF seems to have taken none. Purely hypothetically, these could read similar to: In order to reduce overlap with other development agencies, UNICEF will let half of its health specialists go and hire lawyers instead. These lawyers will help governments to put in place legislation needed for the protection of children from violence, discrimination, abuse and neglect. Purely hypothetically. Does anyone believe that UNICEF could take such a bold – strategic - decision?
Strategic decisions are taken on the basis of the evolving context, the presence of other actors, an analysis of one’s own strengths and weaknesses, comparative advantage and where one can add the most value. Since UNICEF is not taking any strategic decisions, none of this has appeared in the Strategic Plan. In contrast, strategic choices usually are made about what to do and what not to do, or how to shift resources (e.g. from health to legal expertise). At the minimum, the strategic choice is between doing the same as before or doing something different.
Our own organizational goals, for which we need to make strategic (financial, human resource) investment choices, could include: be invited at significant policy tables; be the world authority on children as a knowledge resource; make vaccine cheaper; be within 24 hours at the crisis site; generate a significant volume of successfully negotiated deals for children, ….
Rec. 17: The Strategic Plan must explain UNICEF’s decisions on what to do and what not to do, and how to reallocate its own resources accordingly.
Annex: Milestones of a Government Reform Process
The step-wise description of the policy process in any country allows to identify milestones.- Specialists and a part of the population know that a specific situation or “problem” exists; studies are available; the issue is defined; there could be denial or neglect
- Authorities acknowledge the problem; the situation is compared to international standards; media is picking up stories
- The issue enters the political agenda; it becomes a priority; alliances are being built; there are calls on government to do something
- Expressed commitment by authorities to do something; a reform initiative is launched; development partners want to contribute;
- Consultations take place; policy options are discussed; a policy or law is being drafted, pilots are done
- The policy or law is adopted and assessed to be adequate
- The policy measures are implemented
- The policy intent is realized; the effect of the policy is evaluated.
UNICEF contributions help the country to move from one step to the next. For instance, UNICEF may conduct research about the local situation and generate data to start the process; UNICEF may lobby with officials to acknowledge the issue before someone else blames the government; UNICEF may build alliances to increase political pressure; UNICEF helps the government to create a reform plan and facilitate consultations; and so on.
While it may not be known what exactly caused a policy break-through, it may be possible to judge the criticality of a contribution by articulating a theory of change along such possible milestones.
Following the continuum of the policy process, UNICEF contributions then include
While it may not be known what exactly caused a policy break-through, it may be possible to judge the criticality of a contribution by articulating a theory of change along such possible milestones.
Following the continuum of the policy process, UNICEF contributions then include
- Making the case: Researching and describing the issue or ‘problem’;
- Publicising the findings; helping to generate a broad discussion about possible solutions;
- Assuring and assessing that the draft policy is adequate;
- Supporting the adoption of the policy;
- Support to any actions that realize the policy intent; and
- Monitoring, evaluating and reporting on the effectiveness of the policy measure.
When it comes to policy change, the costs and the effects of advocating, advising, researching, lobbying, media work, alliance building, networking and facilitating are hard to calculate. Not everything that is being said in a consultation has the same weight, and not every piece of policy advice will be taken. The more a development agency is credible, authoritative, and is trusted, the more it can influence the policy choice.
Thanks, Detlef Palm for this very candid assessment - "Rethinking UNICEF insights from outside". I loved your "Tell it like it is" , no words-minced analysis which I found very refreshing. Among the gems of your analysis I found the one on the "Nonsense of Matrix Management" and UN Over-coordination that really saps much energy that could be better used for smarter engagement, very perceptive. It is not "politically correct" to raise such issues, but they need to be raised. I recall doing that in a speech to the large UNICEF gathering in Dubai in 2004 that was much appreciated by most UNICEF Reps, but criticised by some donors, including at the UNICEF Board.
ReplyDeletehttp://kulgautam.org/2004/07/01/unicefs-comparative-advantage-dubai-speech/
By the way, where are you these days, Detlef? Didn't see your name or email address in the XUNICEF Master list of retirees. kulgautam@hotmail.com
Dear All,
ReplyDeleteHaving taken a right turn from when I worked in UNICEF, I now only lightly engage with serious UN work and words. But Detlef Palm's "Rethinking UNICEF" which the diligent Editors at XUNICEF shared in the weekly update of a couple of weeks ago made compelling reading.
At over 7000 words, it has taken me this long to read through it but I feel compelled to comment. And if you have not read it, please do so now. It will not help to refocus for the future, it will help to explain some of the frustrations you felt while with the organization and restore your confidence in your skills.
My first thought was to wonder where Detlef was when the country office staff was going through verbal contortions in their attempt to both influence policy and show evidence.
A Prime Minister, after seeking permission to be frank, said point-blank that the United Nations produce nothing but worthless reports. He may not be alone or else the organization would not now be labeled behind closed doors as United Nothing.
Secondly, before that tongue-in-cheek meaning of the UN becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, I suggest that this write-up should not be confined to UNICEF because, after all, strategic directions are set at a higher level - at the UN.
I could go on but suspect that after reading the excellent write-up, the last thing you need is a lengthy commentary.
Best regards,
Ebun Ekunwe
Dear Ebun Ekunwe,
ReplyDeleteA highly motivational piece from your end one would like to thank you for the same. i am from India. Served Unicef in a special project named Special Child Relief on account of drought and floods in some States. i served for a wee bit under 2 years. Had to move away as they had no regular post available in 1977.
Later i served for 14 years in a core post in India, and the last under-5 years in Yemen.
The years in Yemen were frustrating, with a minimum of job satisfaction. Local corruption + couldn't-care-less attitude in the system kept one at it. Plus on account of mini-wars in Yemen itself. Those were my toughest years of a life lived earlier to serve agencies like Service Civil International {also known as Int. Vol. Service in UK}, Refugee Relief work among the Tibetan and Indian refugees from Pakistan, US Peace Corps,and Christian Childrens' Fund{who made me permanent}.
Friends in Unicef in Yemen and my wife Sudesh pushed & motivated me to stay put till one's retirement date. i retired in July 1994. That makes it 26 years of retirement and a fairly good pension -- the key factor that motivated me to get back to Unicef-India.
CCF of the US had made me permanent even though i had been a non-Christian. They had no policy of retirement allowances though one could work till the age of 65.
Currently i am running my 86 th. So "Love Thy Neighbour" adage & the Lord's Grace have been most kind and generous. It was indeed a joy to work in the era in UNICEF led by men like JP Grant {we used to call him JPG} and David Haxton chief of our India office and the sub-region. And for many years my immediate supervisor Dr Bill Cousins. All that and more {meaning better conditions of work with the GOI system}
made life full of joy and satisfaction. To round it off...Tom Mcdermott {exPC wallah} worked with us before i moved to Yemen. Tom with the others is the Editor & provides us the stamina to share. To get rid of POLIO from India was an amazing inter-agency and the Govt's {GOI's} achievement. Later of course...not during my time ....
i hope based on what you initiated, others too can open up ..& get rid of what i call the style of "Anglo Saxon" reserve.
Many thanks, ..Stay Safe and Healthy through these troubled times.
22/10/2020 dev chopra in gurugram/india
I have not yet read Detlef’s piece but now will. But let me offer some evidence and a couple of references.
ReplyDeleteAfter I left the UNICEF in 1995 and then UNDP’s Human Development Report in 2000, I worked for ten years as part of the UN Intellectual History Project, a project totally independent of the UN in its funding and management and involving about 20 different authors. We interviewedn depth nearly 80 former and present UN staff members, and were based in City University New York.
The project looked in detail at the UN’s work in economic and social development since the beginning, at the time, the first comprehensive project to review all the UN’s work in economic and social areas, except the two volumes of UNICEF’s history done by Maggie Black in . Our approach was to look at the good and the bad, the positive and the negative, the ups and downs, the different agencies and funds of the UN since 1945. The project concluded in 2011 with some 16 volumes. With summaries presented on the website (www.unhistory.org) UNIHP) and two summary volumes, UN Ideas Which Changed the World and UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice.
Before generalizing from a few personal experiences, it would be better to look at some of this wider evidence. With best wishes , Richard Jolly
Dear Detief ,
ReplyDeleteThanks for sharing your article. I ran through with it. My impression was exactly what Richard said in in his last sentence.
BTW, just a thought ….the views of those selected more than a few UN organizations for the Nobel Peace Prize must also be included … I think.
With best regards,
Yoshi
Dear Detlef, Ebun -and others,,
ReplyDeleteI have enjoyed reading this, insightful, well-informed and well-written. You make many good points, based on much real-life experience, in UNICEF and with UNDAF-UNSDCF experience. One can only agree with many of your points and recommendations.
This said, if the whole impact of your piece is to lead some to think they should abandon UNICEF’s mission or underplay its many past achievements, it would be an absurd conclusion. Your recommendations are virtually all positive – designed to be positive and help bring useful changes. I think sometimes you ignore or under-estimate in your account the different and various interests at play in the governments or internationally, positive as well as negative. In our UN histories we argued that there were three UNs- the UN of governments, the UN of staff members and the “third UN” -NGOs, experts and others outside the UN but pressurizing it often positive ways. The third UN was obviously strongly at work in UNICEF, perhaps notably in getting us to take seriously the CRC before Jim Grant and others thought it would make much difference.
I liked your examples section on strategic decisions because it reminded me of the many strategic decisions which UNICEF had taken. For example, in my time, to organize the World Summit for Children, the first world summit ever held in the UN; to set goals for reducing child mortality -at the time when the rest of the UN was against goals - and many other including to decentralize operations very early on, so that by mid-1960s, over 50 % of staff ,now well over 80%, live full time in the countries where UNICEF has programmes.
I think you also make no or hardly any mention of advocacy for children and UNICEF’s record in changing national and international thinking and attitudes children.
On some particulars, I think you also make some minor errors. It was not true, for example, that economists came into UNICEF only in the late 1980s. Economists played the major role in the Bellagio meeting in 1964, assembled by Dick Heyward who himself was an economist. And Giovanni Andrea Cornia who worked in UNICEF from 1981 and with me organized the 1983 meeting which produced the important document, The Impact of World Recession on Children which laid the foundation for our later work on Adjustment with a Human Face.
Reading your piece, made me wonder whether you have read Kul Gautam’s wonderful book, much but not all about UNICEF. He had, I think 37 years in UNICEF and is still highly active internationally. His views and experiences make for an unput-downable book. Global Citizen from Gulmi: My Journey from the Hills of Nepal to the Halls of the United Nations.
Sincerely. I much enjoyed reading your piece. Richard
John Gilmartin
ReplyDeleteI enjoyed Detlef’s paper, and expect many enjoyed his candor about a process that seems to only grow more obscure.
Ebun may not recognize how clever the critique is. I continue astonished and uncomprehending with UN speak, it only gets worse. About the moment I began to understand half of the the latest jargon, the geniuses would change the vocabulary and I’d be lost again.
Towards the end of my Unicef days I felt that many of our visionaries were describing a religion, the UN/ Unicef religion. To succeed in it required faith, and the gods could be capricious. I sensed there were quite a group of backsliders in the rear of our church, and quite a few who never bought into it. Sort of a ‘fake it till you make it gang.’ I was usually somewhere in that group.
If Unicef were invented today it would be very different I think. We’re no longer a significant player. None of the UN is now except the emergency relief agencies. Since Unicef hates getting dirty in cesspool camps, we’re no longer relevant. We do love to talk and write about ‘the poor’.
But, that won’t pay the rent if someone says, ‘it’s time to show us what you’ve been doing.’ It’s not a new problem, and it’s not the staff’s fault. Unicef is blessed with serious hardworking staff. I think a major reduction in budget would be refreshing. I think at least half our offices should close. I think country programs should have no more than three concise projects, time limited, with either Unicef or government accountability for their results. These need to be evaluated independently by non academic non consultants with short comprehensible reports published for the local folks.
I know, very unlikely. I did like Detlef’s comments. I hope he and Ebun can have a quiet conversation about shared excellent.
Thanks, John
Jan Vandemoortele
ReplyDelete8:25 AM (16 minutes ago)
to Detlef, Richard, allmembers@xunicef.com, Ebun
Dear Detlef,
Thanks for writing this critical but thoughtful paper, with the rigor, honesty and dry humour we know you for. It embodies a quote by Dag Hammarskjold: ‘Never for the sake of peace and quiet deny your convictions’. You probably voice many of the frustrations colleagues in the field face, including their struggle with buzzwords that rain down from HQ.
At the core of the paper is a question that transcends UNICEF and the UN, that of the nature and value of development assistance. I guess that many of the points made apply equally to Save the Children, MSF and others organisations.
The perspective you take is, at times, a bit utopian. Whilst concurring with most points you make so well, a bit of pragmatism could be brought in. As Eleanor Roosevelt argued, ‘Because it is the work of fallible human beings, the UN is not a perfect instrument. But it is all we have’. The UN is and remains an intergovernmental body, where member states and their sovereignty are unassailable. The risk is that people with an anti-UN agenda will misuse the paper for their own purpose. In one instance, you take a less utopian perspective, where you write ‘We need to make the best of it. We need to go with the flow. We need to help build the political case’. The trick, however, is to be seen as ‘a politically celibate without being a political virgin’.
I truly enjoyed the paper. It deserves to be read by UNICEF’s senior management.
Jan
I also read the recent paper by Detlef Palm.
ReplyDeleteIt is noteworthy that our old agency has become "staff heavy" and is doing what governments and other local agencies used to do with our technical assistance and programmatic or supply support. My eternal complaint moving from one post to another was that new Reps or sectoral P.O.'s would tend to trash what had worked under an earlier regime and long-term plans or activities would be dropped by the newcomers without at least analysing what had succeeded before starting on a new tack.
Also, HQ would tend to introduce new structures or processes every two or three years. My sense was that every new approach needed at least 3 or 4 years to percolate down to the smallest field segment. As that process took place, HQ would introduce a series of new fads or approaches which only tended to confuse the field offices who had only begun to assimilate the previous new fad.
This further blocked any continuity in the country program approach due to the constant stream of changes. At one point after my retirement, I spent a month in Tacro/Panama to help the office prepare their 2 year management plan. The lack of cooperation from the R.O. staff of advisors was impossible to reach any reasonable conclusion. They were all competing against one another to requisition funds for their own sector interests and there was an overall "pay to play" approach embedded into the structure of the office. each sectoral advisor was operating their own set of "projects" often running parallel with projects ongoing in the country offices. As a wrap up meeting to my work, I told the group and the visiting Deputy EXdir for Programmes that I could not have been happy working within the current changed atmosphere within my beloved agency.
I had experienced this personally when I assumed the role of Area rep for Central America and Panama. The Guatemala office had a set of sub regional advisors who funded parallel projects within the countries of Central America. It took me almost a year to fix what Bellamy had asked me when she transferred me from Pakistan. Her only guidance to me was that Unicef in Central America was broken and that I would figure out how to fix it. She visited us 9 months after I had taken over and during a meeting with all of the Reps and Resident P.O's, she heard them out, looked at me and said "you fixed it". We had been spending 90% of our ceiling on staff with very little left over for useful programs.
One day I will write about how a lack of continuity in third world governments really blocks the possibility of achieving long term results.
More later. Best wishes. Merry Christmas and hopes for a pandemic-less 2021. Jim
I counted in 2005: The East and Southern Africa Regional Office had 55 projects, in addition to the country office projects. There was a widespread belief, that even regional advisors need 'programme funds' to run programmes....
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